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ABSTRACT 
 
ENCOURAGING TRUST AND COOPERATION IN DIGITAL NEGOTIATIONS 
Livia Levine 
Diana Roberston 
 
One of the most important issues in modern society is how society modifies the 
way in which its members develop relationships and foster cooperation in the face of new 
communication technologies.  I explore theoretical and empirical parameters of this 
process and their implications for encouraging trust and cooperation in negotiations. 
I begin with an argument for the role of trust and cooperation as part of the 
foundation of digital commerce by expanding the reach of the social contract theory 
(ISCT) of Donaldson and Dunfee (1994; 1999).  I argue that a digital community is a 
community in the ISCT sense, and that the basic framework of ISCT can apply to the 
digital business world.  I then analyze the roles of trust and cooperation within this 
framework, explaining their moral relevance for e-commerce. 
I follow this discussion with two empirical papers to begin to uncover the nature 
of digital norms.  In “Negotiating with the Millennial Generation” I use a series of 
behavioral studies and online chat analyses to show that people build trusting 
relationships online, often resulting in more cooperation than when they talk face to face. 
I then look at what type of texting creates stronger relationships, showing that longer 
texting conversations that go beyond small talk generated greater trust and rapport. I also 
use a behavioral study involving a smartphone application to discuss how over time 
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people learn to use new forms of communication to build trusting relationships through 
digital media. 
In the third paper “Why the F*** Don’t They TRUST” I develop the notion that 
particular behaviors can affect online trust development. Using analyses of online texts 
and additional behavioral studies I show how norm-defying online incivility decreases 
trust while norm-abiding use of capital letters does not.  I show that encouraging people 
to abide by civility norms develops more trusting and cooperative online environments. 
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PREFACE 
One of the most important issues in modern society is how, in the face of new 
communication technology, its members modify the way in which they develop 
relationships and foster trust and cooperation.  As people rely more heavily on emails, 
instant messages, and text messages, they become accustomed to using these media to 
establish trusting relationships.  I explore theoretical and empirical parameters of this 
process and their implications for encouraging trust and cooperation in negotiations. 
 
Cooperation and Trust 
Norms of cooperation and trust are necessary for promoting society’s aims by 
facilitating community members’ working together to more effectively pursue collective 
goals (Putnam, 1995).  With norms of cooperation, communities can provide more 
collective goods and experience higher group welfare (Hollander, 1990).  Additionally, 
having generalized norms of cooperation encourages participation in social exchanges 
and motivates people to contribute to knowledge exchange, making cooperative norms a 
“foundation of the creation of intellectual capital” (Lesser 2000, Putnam, 1993).  Trust 
promotes cooperation, which in turn promotes greater social capital (Cohen and Prusak, 
2001).  I discuss the importance of trust and cooperation norms – particularly as they 
apply in a digital context – at length in the first paper.  
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Digital Age 
Trust and cooperation are critical aspects of society’s functioning well, and the 
focus of contemporary society is shifting to digital communication and interaction.  We 
see anecdotally that people young and old (particularly Millennials, born after 1982 
(Howe and Strauss, 2007)) are comfortable with digital messaging in a way that emerged 
over the last decade.  Whether at bars (Stein, 2011) in church (Voltattorni, 2011) or even 
when they go to bed (Lohmann, 2011) today’s communicators often turn to digital media 
as their primary form of communication.  I discuss this change in communication 
behavior in the second paper, where I maintain that it calls into question many of the 
accepted wisdoms regarding conflict resolution.  
 The move from face-to-face communication to digital communication impacts the 
business world as well.  In the second quarter of 2014, 6.4% of all retail sales in the U.S. 
were from e-commerce (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014).  One survey shows that seventy-
three percent of corporate employees use instant messaging for business communications 
(The Radicati Group, 2012).  This survey reports business users spending two and a half 
hours of their business day online and averaging 41 minutes of daily instant messaging 
(The Radicati Group, 2012).  We can only imagine how these numbers will increase 
when today’s young population, accustomed to enormous use of digital communication, 
becomes a major part of the workforce. 
 Many have noted how aspects of our society adjust because of changes in 
technologies.  Laczniak and Murphy (2006) discuss the critical role of researchers “to 
identify and evaluate ‘side effects’ of new technologies in terms of how they must be 
balanced to promote greater economic fairness and justice.”  In this dissertation I aim to 
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answer this call in part, analyzing how society modifies how its members develop 
trusting relationships and foster cooperation in the face of new communication 
technologies. 
 
Overview 
In three papers I incorporate deontological arguments for ethically-appropriate 
online behavior with analyses of the consequences of these behaviors.  Overall, I show 
that especially in the digital age, acting ethically has significant effects on trust and 
cooperation. 
I begin with an argument for the role of trust and cooperation as part of the 
foundation of digital commerce by expanding the reach of the Integrative Social Contract 
Theory (ISCT) of Donaldson and Dunfee (1994; 1999).  I ask whether a digital business 
community can be a community in the morally relevant ways that Donaldson and Dunfee 
describe.  I conclude that a digital community is a community in the ISCT sense, and 
therefore the basic framework of ISCT can apply to a digital business world similarly to 
its application in the offline business world.  I then analyze the roles of trust and 
cooperation in e-commerce, showing how they are important to the digital business 
community and explaining their moral relevance under a digital form of ISCT.  With this 
understanding I highlight the significant role that trust and cooperation play in this field. 
I follow this discussion with two empirical papers whose aim is to understand 
aspects of trust and cooperation norms in a digital context.  The first analyzes how people 
use different communication media to create trust and cooperation in negotiations.  In 
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contrast to research on the topic from prior decades, I show that many people, particularly 
Millennials, build trusting and cooperative relationships via digital communication just as 
well as they do in person. I analyze what particular aspects of digital communication 
create more trust, and show that people can learn to use digital communication to build 
trust over time. 
In the third paper I continue this process, testing the effects of two particular 
digital behaviors: norm-violating online incivility and norm-abiding online shouting.  I 
analyze which types of behaviors are considered uncivil in a digital context, particularly 
in online chats.  Then I show that encouraging people to abide by civility norms develops 
more trusting and cooperative online environments. 
 
Methodological Background 
 There are two approaches to studying business ethics:  Normative methods 
describe how things should be (e.g. people should not lie) while empirical methods which 
describe how things are (e.g. most people lie once a day).  The comprehensive study of 
business ethics requires utilization of both empirical and normative perspectives 
(Donaldson, 1994; Robertson, 1993).  In this dissertation I attempt to combine these two 
methods with a “symbiotic” approach, where the theoretical cores of normative ethics 
and behavioral research remain separate, but in which the normative goals guide the 
focus of the empirical studies (Weaver and Trevino, 1994). 
In the first paper I develop a normative perspective about the roles of trust and 
cooperation in a digital community.  In the second paper I use these normatively 
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important issues to direct the empirical discussion; I aim to explain what conditions affect 
this ethical behavior.  In the third paper I use empirical studies to develop a normative 
consequentialist analysis of incivility.  While causal accounts cannot replace moral 
justification, we can expect to “learn from experiments in living” (Appiah, 2008).  In 
particular, I use the empirical findings of the results of online incivility to help describe 
why it is normatively wrong; incivility is wrong (in part) because it leads to negative 
social consequences. 
By utilizing this “symbiotic” approach to understanding online negotiations, I 
attempt to fulfill the research need described by Wicks and Freeman (1998) “To develop 
research that is focused on serving human purposes – i.e. both morally rich and useful to 
organizations and the communities in which they operate.”  In this dissertation I strive to 
convey the moral richness involved in discussions of cooperation, trust, and incivility, 
with the goal of being useful to contemporary businesses, online communities, and 
individuals who utilize digital communication. 
Daniel McAllister (1995) wrote that, “Because economic action is embedded 
within networks of social relationships, researchers have argued that efficiency within 
complex systems of coordinated action is only possible when inter-dependent actors work 
together effectively.  Trust between such actors is seen as a determining factor.”  This 
dissertation brings the normative and empirical discussions of trust and effective 
cooperation in these social relationships to a new reality – the digital society.  
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1 
DIGITAL TRUST AND COOPERATION WITH AN INTEGRATIVE DIGITAL 
SOCIAL CONTRACT 
 
“Despite the long evolution path, the modern e-commerce still has to deal with such 
challenges as customers’ distrust, doubt and perceived fear.  But why do such barriers 
exist…?  The answer is simple: no matter what digital revolution may bring, we are still 
human beings.” 
-Vitaly Gonkov, blogger, 2014 
 
E-Commerce Ethics 
 
Kracher and Corritore (2004) raise the possibility that e-commerce requires a 
special set of business rules which contend with the interconnectedness, simplicity, 
speed, virtuality and cost savings of conducting business on the World Wide Web.  They 
conclude that ethical principles from non-digital businesses can apply to e-commerce, 
with different manifestations.  A decade later this issue has ballooned as e-commerce 
comprises not just online business transactions, but also negotiations, presentations, and 
business networking conducted digitally.  In this paper I discuss trust and cooperation in 
this expanded e-commerce, involving online markets, SMS messages, social media, and 
any other digital forum in which business is conducted.  I expand the reach of Donaldson 
and Dunfee’s Integrative Social Contract Theory (ISCT) (1994; 1999) to digital 
communities and argue that trust and cooperation are part of the foundation of digital 
2 
commerce. Because ISCT was designed to fit a dynamic ethical environment including 
different cultural and moral perspectives, it is a fitting framework for discussing ethics in 
e-commerce. 
To start with, I ask whether a digital business community (such as the virtual 
communities described in the marketing literature (Hemetsberger, 2001)) can be a 
community in the morally relevant ways that Donaldson and Dunfee describe.  I conclude 
that a digital community is a community in the ISCT sense, and therefore the basic 
framework of ISCT can apply to a digital business world similarly to its application in the 
offline business world.  I then analyze the roles of trust and cooperation in e-commerce, 
showing that they are important to the digital business community and explaining their 
moral relevance under a digital form of ISCT. 
The rise of online businesses came with a host of ethical issues, such as the ethics 
of spyware, privacy, data mining, data breaches, spam marketing, and the protection of 
digital property (Laczniak and Murphy, 2006; Palmer and Stoll, 2014; Radin, Calkins & 
Predmore, 2007; Yang, Chandlrees, Lin & Chao, 2009).  Although many areas of 
business include significant risks (such as the risk for a banker of a financial meltdown,) 
e-commerce entails additional significant risks for parties who do not necessarily have 
ways of identifying each other and may live under different rules of law as the people 
with whom they conduct business (Resnick, Zeckhauser, Friedman, & Kuwabara, 2000).  
This risk highlights the importance of trust and cooperative relationships in e-commerce 
(Mathwick, 2002; Yang et al., 2009).  
Because of the risk of doing business digitally, individuals and firms need to 
develop an environment of trust and cooperation that allows e-commerce participants to 
3 
reap the benefits of digital business (such as speed, cost savings, and interconnectedness, 
described by Kracher and Corritore, 2004).  From a business ethics perspective, this begs 
the question: What is the digital business person’s responsibility in promoting digital trust 
and cooperation? 
There are a number of different approaches to answering this question.  Some 
researchers assume specific ethical values online, such as privacy, truthfulness and 
property rights, spending their time discussing the effects of these behaviors online (e.g. 
Yang et al., 2009) or the way people make these ethical decisions (Sarker, Sarker, 
Chatterjee & Valacich, 2010).  Kracher and Corritore (2004) apply “brick-and-mortar” 
moral principles such as rule utilitarianism and Aristotelian virtue ethics to explain ethics 
in e-commerce.  Others use just war criteria (Schmidt, 2014) Kantian (Bowie and Jamal, 
2006) or Hegelian principles (Spinello, 2005) to explain moral responsibilities in the 
technological global economy. 
In this paper I take a different approach to e-commerce ethics; I understand the 
role of trust and cooperation not only as ethical principles (Baier, 1986; Horsburgh, 1962; 
Michalos, 1990; Strudler, 2005), but as part of the foundation of digital commerce.  To 
further this understanding, I turn to social contract theories.  Following a tradition of 
developing social contract theories to explain business ethics (Bishop, 2008; Calton and 
Lad, 1995; Robertson and Ross, 1995; Wempe, 2005), I expand on Donaldson and 
Dunfee’s (1994; 1999) social contract theory to clarify two aspects of digital business 
ethics: trust and cooperation. 
Donaldson and Dunfee’s (1994; 1999) ISCT gained significant traction over the 
past two decades as a way of understanding issues surfacing in international business 
4 
ethics (Garriga & Melé, 2004; Mayer & Cava, 1995).   In this paper I expand the reach of 
this theory to include e-commerce and digital communication related to business.  
Donaldson and Dunfee (1994; 1999) introduce their discussion of a social contracts 
approach to business ethics by explaining that the norms of business undergo constant 
change; contemporary businesses have unique ethical problems and solutions, and the 
classic philosophical approaches cannot fully answer the ethical questions that arise from 
business.  By 1994 Donaldson and Dunfee felt that a new world had developed – a 
business world that from an ethical perspective differed from previous business worlds 
and from other moral parts of our lives (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994).  Just as Donaldson 
and Dunfee felt that “the ethical game in business is played by different rules…than it did 
decades ago,” the last two decades since the publication of the ISCT literature has seen its 
own upheaval in the way business is done, and with that, in the way the “ethical game” is 
played.  Today many of our business interactions – be they negotiations, presentations, 
networking, or actual transactions – are conducted online.  Many of the ethical challenges 
Donaldson and Dunfee describe as stemming from business being “almost entirely the 
product of human design” (1999:14, emphasis added), make the entirely humanly 
designed internet a moral minefield (Kracher and Corritore, 2004; Laczniak and Murphy, 
2006; Lessig, 2001; Maner, 1996; Schmidt, 2004; Spinello, 2005; Tavani, 2001).  Since 
ISCT addresses many of the issues involved in understanding ethics in a dynamic and 
multicultural environments, it is a useful framework for studying e-commerce ethics.  
Therefore, I use the ISCT tools as I aim to advance the relatively new field of e-
commerce ethics, and will highlight the significant role that trust and cooperation play in 
this field.  
5 
Defining “Trust” and “Cooperation” 
 
Although trust and cooperation are relevant issues for any business environment, 
they are particularly important to digital commerce because of a unique aspect of this 
type of business: increased risk (Resnick, Zeckhauser, Friedman & Kuwabara, 2000).  
First I will discuss this risk; then I will describe the trust necessary to build cooperative 
digital business environments despite the additional risk.  This will provide the basis for 
the discussion regarding the moral responsibility to promote trust and cooperation in 
digital business communities. 
 
Risk and Trust 
 
The definition of risk as an uncertainty associated with a significant loss (Yates 
and Stone, 1992) is well accepted in the literature addressing the relationship between 
risk and trust (Chiles and McMackin, 1996).  Gefen, Rao, and Tractinsky (2003) identify 
relationships between trust and risk that emerge from the literature:
 1
 
1. Trust reduces the perception of risk. 
2. When risk is relevant, trust is relevant; when risk is not relevant, trust is not 
relevant. 
3. When trust is high, risk has less impact on behavior than when trust is low. 
                                                             
 
1 The type of risk described by Gefen et al. is not specific to digital commerce, but rather 
describing potential relationships between risk and trust in general.  
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4. Trust and risk perceptions are formed independently; if the level of trust 
surpasses the threshold of perceived risk then the trustor will engage in a risk-
taking relationship.
2
 
These relationships are not mutually exclusive.  For example, Ryan and Buchholtz (2001) 
write that trust would not be necessary without risk (2) and also that trust is involved in 
the determination of perceived risk (1).  From the moral philosophy field, Flores and 
Solomon (1998) define trust and risk together: “Creating trust is taking a risk.”  In 
particular, Flores and Solomon emphasize the importance of what they term authentic 
trust, in which risks have been well thought out and accepted (similar to explanation 4 
above). 
Propositions 2 and 4 are most relevant for our discussion of digital trust.  Though 
e-commerce is not unique in its inclusion of risk, there are many uncertainties involving 
significant losses that specifically arise in digital business (Resnick, Zeckhauser, 
Friedman & Kuwabara, 2000).  Participants cannot always identify each other and often 
do not have legal or social means to punish people who renege on their commitments.  
People conducting business online feel a lack of control and greater vulnerability because 
the parties are faceless and the transactions are paperless (Yang et al., 2009).  
Additionally, communicating digitally changes the use of nonverbal cues and emotional 
expressions and limits social and contextual information (Erez, Lisak, Harush, Glikson, 
                                                             
 
2
 There is also a fifth relationship discussed by Gefen et al. which we do not discuss here: 
Trust and risk are independent and independently affect behavior. 
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Nouri, & Shokef, 2013; Gibson and Gibbs, 2006) which can increase anxiety and 
insecurity about others’ performance (Byron, 2008).  Furthermore, people involved in e-
commerce often have to deal with unique logistical coordination problems, cultural 
diversity, different expectations for communication behaviors, and language differences.  
These factors often cause misunderstandings and divisions between individuals who are 
supposed to be working together, making it more difficult to form a “cohesive and 
functioning team” (Erez et al., 2013). 
For example, people may not communicate frequently because of difficulties 
coordinating time differences, which makes it harder for people to work together.  
Alternatively, someone from a high-honor culture may expect to be addressed with 
formality, while those from other cultures may address that person by her first name.  
Someone may call a meeting for 10:00 A.M. in his time zone, not recognizing that it is 
the middle of the night for other people he works with, which may anger the others in the 
group.  These types of misunderstandings can create distrust among team members 
(Gibson and Gibbs, 2006).  Furthermore, these factors may increase the risk of non-
desirable outcomes stemming from team members not understanding each other or not 
working well together (Erez et al., 2013).  These also make it harder to form a collective 
identity that promotes shared commitments to a common goal (Furst, Reeves, Rosen & 
Blackburn, 2004), making cooperation more difficult. 
Risks are high, and therefore trust is especially relevant in e-commerce (2).  
Additionally, if we consider trust and risk perceptions to be formed independently (4), 
then the increased uncertainty means that greater trust is required in order to enable 
people to engage in digital business.  Because of the high risks and importance of trust in 
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e-commerce, I look to the literature on moral philosophy and organizational behavior to 
identify common denominators in the varying understandings of trust, which I then apply 
to digital trust. 
 
What Is Trust? 
Business ethicists in the past looked at trust and cooperation as intrinsic parts of 
business ethics (Flores & Solomon, 1998; Romar, 2004), and as a basis for understanding 
international business morality (Brenkert, 1998).  Researchers in both organizational 
behavior and philosophy discuss trust and its many facets – the causes and effects of 
trust, the incidence of trust in different circumstances, and the reasons why society does 
or does not want trust.
3
  In many ways, these two disciplines view trust similarly.  What 
follows is not a comprehensive review of all definitions of trust in moral philosophy and 
organizational behavior; that task is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, I intend to 
identify specific examples of frequently cited literature to show the similarities between 
these two disciplines’ views of trust in order to come to a definition of trust that will be 
useful for discussing trust in e-commerce.   
While moral philosophers and organizational behavior researchers may distance 
themselves from each other by using different terminology and publishing in different 
                                                             
 
3
 For example: Becker, 1996; Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005; Gauthier, 1986; Halevy and 
Chou, 2013; Hardin, 1996; Hollis, 1998; Horsburgh 1961; Hosmer, 1995; Jones, 1996; 
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Michalos 1990; Pettit, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, 
and Camerer, 1998; Halevy and Chou, 2013. 
9 
journals, both groups seem to be talking about the same basic concept of trust, which for 
the most part includes: 
1. a willingness, intention, or attitude 
2. risk or vulnerability (either in trusting itself or in the behavioral 
manifestation of trust) 
3. positive expectation/optimism 
4. a relationship between the trustor and the trustee (in some but not all 
definitions of trust in both sets of literature) 
In addition, both disciplines are concerned with many of the same facets of trust:  
Why do people trust (Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005; Jones, 1996; Mayer, Davis, et al., 
1995; Pettit, 1995)?  Why does society need trust (Becker, 1996; Brenkert, 1998; 
Horsburgh, 1961; Hosmer, 1995; Mayer, Davis, et al., 1995; Michalos, 1990)?  What is 
the role of the trustee in the trustor’s trust (Jones, 1996; Mayer, Davis, et al., 1995; Pettit, 
1995; Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006)?  
Does trust need to be directed towards a specific trustee (Becker, 1996; Mayer, Davis, et 
al., 1995; Strudler, 2005)?  These questions are similarly important for trust in digital 
business; understanding what trust is will help us to understand the role of trust for e-
commerce. 
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Organizational Behavior’s Trust 
In Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman’s article “An Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust” (1995), the authors define trust in a way that is widely cited in 
organizational behavior literature: 
Trust…is the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control that other party. (Mayer, Davis, et al., 1995:712) 
 
This definition is widely recognized and frequently cited (Corley and Gioia, 2011).  In 
recent years it has been used as a basis for discussion in many papers (e.g. Bevelander 
and Page, 2011; Bianchi and Brockner, 2012; Colquitt and Rodell, 2011; Desmet, D 
Cremer, & van Dijk, 2011; Dunn, Ruedy & Schweitzer, 2012; Gulati, Wohlgezogen   &
Zhelyazkov, 2012; Kramer and Lewicki, 2010; Lount Jr. And Pettit, 2012; Malhotra and 
Lumineau, 2011; Palanski, Surinder & Yammarino, 2010; Rupp, Shao, Jones and Liao, 
2014; Sonenshein, Herzenstein & Dholakia, 2011) and has thousands of citations. 
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998) discuss a similar notion of trust: 
Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or 
behavior of another. (Rousseau et al., 1998:395)
4
 
 
This definition has also been widely cited and has been heralded as the “converged upon” 
definition of trust in organizational behavior research (Li and Tan, 2013; Van Lange, 
Joireman, Parks & Van Dijk, 2013).  (See for example: Desmet, D Cremer & van Dijk, 
2011; Dunn, Ruedy & Schweitzer, 2012; Erez, et al, 2013; Kim, Cooper, Dirks & Ferrin, 
                                                             
 
4
 They describe their definition of trust as “cross-discipline,” although their paper does 
not explicitly reference the discipline of moral philosophy. 
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2013; Kramer and Lewicki, 2010; Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011; Mislin, Campagna & 
Bottom, 2011.) 
 
Moral Philosophy’s Trust 
Unlike organizational behavior researchers, moral philosophers have not 
converged on a definition of trust.  Here I discuss a number of relevant and commonly 
discussed aspects of trust discussed in moral philosophy literature.  This is intended not 
as a comprehensive list, but rather to reflect some of the variety of understandings of this 
topic. 
Many philosophers think of trust as an expectation or optimism, much like many 
organizational behavior researchers (e.g., Becker, 1996; Hardin, 1996; Hollis, 1998; 
Pettit, 1995). 
For example, Philip Pettit (1995) describes a “trusting reliance” in which 
one person relies…on another to do something A; this reliance is manifest 
to the other; and the first person expects the second to be well disposed 
and to attach a greater utility to doing A for the fact that it represents a 
way of proving reliable. (Pettit, 1995:206) 
 
Karen Jones (1996) has a similar view of trust as 
an attitude of optimism that the goodwill and competence of another will 
extend to cover the domain of our interaction with her, together with the 
expectation that the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by 
the thought that we are counting on her. (Jones, 1996:4) 
 
Lawrence Becker (1996) describes trust as “a sense of security about other people’s 
benevolence, conscientiousness, and reciprocity” (Becker, 1996:43). 
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 Authors of recent discussions of trust in moral philosophy, (including Karen 
Jones’ in her later work,) understand trust as a function of its effects.  Some view trust 
not just as an affect or attitude, but as an enabler of attitude (e.g. trust can result in a 
feeling of betrayal) (Townley and Garfield, 2013).  Others see trust as a mechanism for 
changing how people interpret their situations and justify both taking risks (Jones, 2013) 
and depending on others (Ruokonen, 2013).  These authors and other recent writings 
suggest that trust is particularly relevant for risky situations, when the outcome (the 
trustee’s action or inaction) is uncertain (Airaksinen, 2013). 
 
Joining Two Worlds 
Perhaps the most significant distinction between the organizational behavior 
literature and philosophical accounts relates to the reason why the trustee is expected to 
behave favorably towards the trustor.  For some moral philosophers, this is a belief in the 
trustor’s benevolence and conscientiousness (Becker, 1996) or her adhesion to ethical 
principles (Baier, 1986; Horsburgh, 1962; Michalos, 1990) and explicit promises 
(Strudler, 2005).  Many behavioral researchers view trust as a willingness to accept 
vulnerability because of a belief in the trustee’s competence and integrity, and the 
reasonable likelihood that these traits will affect particular behaviors (Kim, Ferrin, 
Cooper and Dirks, 2004). 
Despite some differences on the reasons for trusting, there is considerable overlap 
between the fields of moral philosophy and organizational behavior.  Many authors in 
both fields recognize that there is some combination of factors that make a person act in a 
trusting manner, and is the reason why a trustor will trust a trustee.  Mayer et al. (1995) 
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discuss three factors that arise from the organizational behavior literature: ability, 
benevolence, and integrity.  Similar notions appear in the philosophical literature as well: 
competence (ability), goodwill (benevolence), and the desire to be reliable (integrity) 
(Becker, 1996; Jones, 1996; Pettit, 1995). 
Although organizational behavior researchers and philosophers approach trust 
with different lenses, many organizational behavior researchers and philosophers who 
take an unmoralized view of trust are talking about the same things mentioned earlier in 
this paper: 
1. a willingness, intention, or attitude 
2. involving an uncertainty associated with significant loss (risk) 
These views of trust include many of the same underlying values: 
3. positive expectations about another’s behavior, and 
4. a relationship between the trustor and the trustee 
Many researchers from the fields of both moral philosophy and organizational 
behavior are interested in trust that involves a willingness to take a risk based on an 
expectation that the trustor will act in the trustee’s interests.  This is the definition I 
rely on for the arguments in this paper.  My intention with this definition is not to answer 
the question “what is trust” on a philosophical level, but to incorporate many of the 
critical aspects of trust that arise in these fields into a working understanding of trust for 
use in the rest of this paper.  This type of trust takes place in situations of uncertainty 
associated with loss which is particularly relevant to the high-risk e-commerce 
environment that I discuss in this paper. 
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Trust and Cooperation 
With this definition we can think of trust as an attitude (willingness) and not a 
behavior.  One aspect of this kind of trust is that it enables cooperative behavior 
(Gambetta, 1988).  In Hosmer’s discussion of organizational theory and moral 
philosophy, he presents this idea as a general consensus in the literature regarding 
cooperation: 
Trust is generally associated with willing, not forced, cooperation and with 
the benefits resulting from that cooperation.… The objective of trust is 
usually expressed as an attempt to increase or facilitate cooperation and/or 
the potential for joint benefits. (Hosmer 1995:390) 
Trust often leads to cooperative behavior, but isn’t a necessary condition for 
cooperation because there can be cooperation without risk, or with minimal risk (Mayer, 
Davis, et al.,1995:712), which therefore would not require trust (Rousseau et al., 
1998:399).  However, cooperation that involves risk arising from cooperation failures, 
such as cooperation needed for many online business transactions (Son, Tu & Benbasat, 
2006), does require trust.  If people do not trust that the other parties will also work 
towards the benefit of others involved in the transaction, they will not risk cooperating. 
Particularly in scenarios where cooperation is a big risk, such as financial or time 
contributions to a digital business deal, trust plays a significant role (Gulati, 
Wohlgezogen & Zhelyazkov, 2012).  If an individual is concerned that the other parties 
will not contribute towards the group benefit, she will not cooperate in the effort.  
However if she trusts that the other parties will also contribute the finances and time they 
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have pledged, then she will be more likely to cooperate as well.  Therefore in this paper I 
discuss cooperation in risky circumstances as a resulting behavior of the attitude of 
trust (Gulati and Sytch, 2008; Gulati et al., 2012; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998). 
 
Why Trust and Cooperate 
There are many approaches to thinking about the reasons people should (from a 
moral perspective) trust and be trustworthy and cooperative.  Some philosophers describe 
the duty to trust and cooperate as part of a Kantian duty to act with beneficence and to 
protect the rights and interests of others (Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 2004; 
Michalos, 1990).  Others describe a moral requirement to cooperate which stems from an 
explicit relationship between the parties and from the trustor’s holding the autonomy of 
the trustee (Strudler, 2005).  Others view trustworthiness as a virtue, either in the 
Aristotelian sense of defining a good character (Horsburgh 1960; Solomon 1992) or as an 
attribute with intrinsic value, like courage (Brenkert 1998).  In the rest of this paper I will 
explore an alternative explanation for why – morally – people should build a trusting 
culture, particularly online.  This explanation relies on an application of Donaldson and 
Dunfee’s ISCT to digital communities. 
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ISCT in a Digital World 
 
I turn to ISCT to provide a framework for analyzing moral responsibility to trust 
and cooperate in an e-commerce environment.  I start by describing some of the basic 
concepts of ISCT.  The premise of this theory is that the global business community is 
made up of smaller communities.  I show that digital communities qualify as 
communities and that ISCT applies to these structures.  I then use the argument of ISCT 
to explain the importance of trust and cooperation in these digital communities. 
 
Contracting ISCT 
Donaldson and Dunfee’s ISCT is a hypothetical social contract – an agreement 
about moral responsibilities in the business world – to which hypothetical contractors 
would agree.  Like Rawls (1971), Donaldson and Dunfee put their hypothetical 
contractors behind a veil of ignorance, obscuring who they are: where they fall 
socioeconomically, and what their personal wealth is.  Unlike Rawls (but similar to 
Harsanyi (1977,) Donaldson and Dunfee assume that their contractors do know their own 
economic and political preferences and the basic values to which they subscribe.  
Donaldson and Dunfee’s contractors use their economic and political preferences, 
combined with their understanding of morality to determine a set of core assumptions.  
Because of this approach, Donaldson and Dunfee’s contractors end up with a social 
contract based largely on fundamental moral norms which they call “hypernorms.”  
Specifically, Donaldson and Dunfee divide the obligations that stem from this social 
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contract into two categories: hypernorms and community-specific norms.  Hypernorms 
are consistent with precepts of major philosophies and with universal human values.  
Widespread consensus that a norm is universal indicates its potential qualification as a 
hypernorm, as does support by international and regional organizations, such as the 
OECD.  Some examples of hypernorms are human rights (such as rights to life, liberty, 
security, and privacy) and complying with contracts.  Donaldson and Dunfee do not 
identify a particular source of hypernorms, but state: “Whether hypernorms are based in 
reason or in nature, they should be recognizable in a convergence of intellectual thought 
and should be proclaimed global norms” (1999:74). 
Community-specific norms (such as addressing seniors with terms of respect) are 
consistent with the behavior and beliefs of most individuals in the group and reflect 
chosen values and preferences.  Community-specific norms include addressing seniors 
with terms of respect, or “going Dutch” on a first date.  These norms are authentic norms 
when they are generated in microsocial contracts, meaning that individuals in the 
community willingly consent to the norms.  Community-specific norms are obligatory 
only if they are “legitimate,” meaning that they do not conflict with hypernorms. 
The implication of ISCT is that hypernorms create moral obligations for 
everyone, while community-specific norms only create obligations for the communities 
that adopt them (as long as they are consistent with hypernorms). 
Just as Donaldson and Dunfee’s hypothetical contractors rely on their 
understanding of moral principles as well as their appreciation for local differences, I 
assume that online hypothetical contractors under the same conditions would rely on the 
same principles and interests to contract something like ISCT.  There is no reason to 
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assume that people who interact online have a different understanding of hypernorms 
than the offline hypothetical contractor.  The only distinction to draw between the 
Integrative Social Contract and the Integrative Digital Contract is in defining a 
community for the purposes of determining community norms.  In a digital world 
“community” can include people who never meet, do not work for the same company, 
and are not geographically close, but who interact in a significant communal way, as I 
will discuss below. 
 
Expanding the Moral Community 
Donaldson and Dunfee’s ISCT is useful to businesses because many global 
businesses function in different parts of the world and conduct business with people who 
have diverse moral and cultural viewpoints.  For the same reason, ISCT applies to diverse 
digital life.  Leaving aside virtual worlds and bots, and focusing solely on business-
related digital use, we can appreciate the range of backgrounds and attitudes that interact 
online, as an MBA-trained venture capitalist can buy a product from a high school 
dropout.  But more relevant to our discussion is the diversity in ethical beliefs and 
understanding of moral responsibility that is found on the internet (Erez et al., 2013; 
Kracher and Corritore, 2004; Vardi, 2001).  E-commerce opens up new business 
environments, cultures, and behaviors for ethical examination (Kracher and Corritore, 
2004); individuals collaborating in e-commerce are working together, but they may have 
very different understandings of their ethical and moral responsibilities to that work, 
possibly stemming from their diversity in culture and education. 
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Donaldson and Dunfee’s solution for the moral dilemmas of the ethically diverse 
offline business world is a social contracts approach that takes into account both 
international moral sensibility and local moral norms.  Like other social contracts, ISCT 
derives its authority from the assumption that people acting rationally would 
hypothetically consent to the terms of a contract affecting the community of which they 
are a member. 
The relevant question for this paper is whether people who conduct business-
related communication and activities online are considered a community.  Research on 
virtual behavior indicates that people exhibit social behavior online similar to offline 
communities.  For example, Erez et al. (2013) discuss global identity – a “sense of 
belonging” to global multicultural teams – which increases when people work together 
online.  Global identity encourages individuals to view others (even those who are not 
geographically nearby) as belonging to their in-group (Erez et al., 2013); in other words, 
when people work together on teams they form communities.  These communities are 
similar to the structures described by Donaldson and Dunfee. 
Donaldson and Dunfee discuss different types of groups that qualify as 
communities, from corporations to informal community structures: 
We previously defined a community as “a self-defined, self-circumscribed 
group of people who interact in the context of shared tasks, values, or 
goals and who are capable of establishing norms of ethical behavior for 
themselves” (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994:273).  This open-ended 
definition is intended to allow for great variety in the way in which people 
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form relationships capable of generating authentic ethical norms. 
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999:98) 
Using this definition, we can think of many online groups that can be considered 
communities.  Online support groups provide participants with a sense of intimacy and 
emotional bonding (Stephen, 2014).  For online retailer Amazon, buyers and reviewers 
interact in the review process, and have established norms such as being specific and 
sincere (Dobrescu, Luca & Motta, 2013).  On the social networking and news site Reddit, 
community members submit content in particular subject areas (called threads).  Reddit’s 
“startup” thread has a stated ethic to give unbiased advice (Reddit, b).  There are 
countless other examples of online communities that are not only capable of establishing 
norms, but have actually defined norms of ethical behavior for themselves. 
Many of these online groups (such as Amazon, Reddit, and countless others,) 
require people to sign-up for membership before posting, thus creating a distinct group.  
Others don’t require membership, but create strong group bonds through mutual 
participation which define their community. 
In addition, there are many informal groups that have informally defined norms of 
ethical behavior.  Donaldson and Dunfee describe these types of groups as communities 
as well.  They explain that while corporations are the most easily identifiable community 
in ISCT, authentic norms can be developed by highly informal, even transient 
communities.  People develop norms of mutual commitment, with a “common fate” 
identity emerging in their small, transient community (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999:99).  
Under these terms, even people engaged in an email exchange about a business in which 
they are both invested could be considered a community.  The members of these 
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communities, like the members of Donaldson and Dunfee’s global business communities, 
could each hypothetically consent to the terms of a social contract similar to ISCT.  
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Trust and Cooperation in ISCT 
 
Necessary Social Efficiency 
Since online communities fit Donaldson and Dunfee’s description of community 
and the general framework of ISCT applies to the Integrative Digital Contract, I can 
apply some of the specific hypernorms from the ISCT literature to online contexts.  
Donaldson and Dunfee describe three types of hypernorms that create moral obligations 
for everyone: procedural (rights of exit and voice), structural (necessary for political and 
social organization), and substantive (fundamental concepts of right and good). 
One example of a structural hypernorm they develop is necessary social 
efficiency.  Donaldson and Dunfee’s argument for a hypernorm of efficiency is 
essentially that if a good possesses “intrinsic worth for society,” then it is a good that 
society must pursue.  This pursuit of necessary goods is a moral good.  More efficient 
pursuit of necessary goods – enabling the pursuit of more necessary goods for more 
people – itself has intrinsic worth for society and is a moral good.  Thus Donaldson and 
Dunfee show the importance of attaining efficiency for fundamental values, with the 
caveat that the efficient pursuit of one good does not violate a different necessary good.   
The category of necessary goods includes things that all rational people (and “any 
society anywhere”) want more of (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999:119).  Relying on Rawls 
(1993) and Sen (1992), Donaldson and Dunfee outline two necessary goods that they 
consider relevant to the discussion of efficiency in business ethics: fairness/justice and 
aggregative economic welfare.  This approach leads the authors to the belief that 
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efficiency in the pursuit of either aggregative economic welfare or fairness is an implied 
(“necessary”) moral good for members of society. 
 
Trust and Cooperation as Efficient Strategies 
Donaldson and Dunfee point out the need for collective solutions, and in 
particular for adequate systems and frameworks that support efficiency.  The “efficiency 
strategies” that a particular society undertakes to achieve fairness and aggregate 
economic welfare may consist of both formal rules and informal norms and habits.  Many 
of these strategies become microsocial norms, meaning that they contain moral 
obligations for the societies that adopt them. 
The more obvious role for digital trust and cooperation in improving necessary 
social goods is in supporting aggregate economic welfare.  Cooperation is a foundation of 
the strategies promoting greater efficiency in aggregate economic welfare.  Adam Smith 
(1776) raises this notion in his iconic pin factory example.  Ten individuals contribute to 
the production of pins, each person performing a different task in the manufacturing 
process.  It is only because of their cooperation that they are able to create any pins at all.  
The same is true, Smith writes, of most of our goods which require “the assistance and 
cooperation of many thousands” (Smith 1776, book 1, chapter 1). 
Contemporary thinkers support the idea that cooperation is necessary for social 
efficiency.  Donaldson and Dunfee cite Jones (1994), who writes that “without 
cooperation, production of any meaningful magnitude is not feasible.”  Aggregate 
economic welfare benefits from a behavioral norm of cooperation.  With this norm, 
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communities can provide more collective goods and experience higher group welfare 
(Hollander, 1990). 
In social dilemmas, cooperation can often prevent individual rationality from 
leading to collective irrationality (Kollock, 1998).  Additionally, having generalized 
norms of cooperation encourages participation in social exchanges, and motivates people 
to contribute to knowledge exchange, making cooperative norms a “foundation of the 
creation of intellectual capital” (Lesser 2000; Putnam, 1993). 
Putnam (1995) illustrates this view from a sociological perspective.  He describes 
social capital as aspects of social life that enable communities to act together more 
effectively in pursuing collective goals.  Examples of these “social connections” in 
Putnam’s work include norms of cooperation and trust.  Trust promotes cooperation, 
which in turn promotes greater social capital.  Cohen and Prusak (2001) outline this 
relationship: 
Trust is the one essential lubricant to any and all social activities.… In the 
event of conflict, trust is essential, as failed attempts at negotiation 
between countries and ethnic or religious groups sometimes painfully 
demonstrate.  Trust is basic to human society.…  The relationships, 
communities, cooperation, and mutual commitment that characterize 
social capital could not exist without a reasonable level of trust.…  We see 
trust as a necessary condition of social capital, and its natural starting 
point. (Cohen and Prusak, 2001:29) 
Donaldson and Dunfee also discuss the benefits of trust in increasing efficiency in 
aggregate economic welfare: 
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Ethical principles, including trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation, can 
result in significant competitive advantages over time for corporations 
(Jones, 1995).  Trust (Hosmer, 1995) is an especially potent engine of 
efficiency inside corporations insofar as it obviates the need for expensive 
compliance structures (Jones, 1995).  (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999:128) 
Corporations are not the only beneficiaries of norms of cooperation and trust.  
Cohen and Prusak’s conception of social capital that stems from trust and cooperation is 
linked with economic growth (Whiteley, 2000) and can increase the advantages of social 
investments in physical and human capital (Cerreta, 2003).  Researchers also associate 
this type of social capital with lower transaction costs and faster innovation (Putnam, 
1993). 
Trust and cooperation in online communities can build social capital and 
contribute to greater efficiency in aggregate economic welfare.  Fukuyama (1995) 
discusses “spontaneous sociability” which stems from high levels of intra-communal 
trust.  This sociability explains people’s willingness to participate in organizations 
outside of their families (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999:129) and can also go a long way in 
explaining why people feel obligations towards online groups and communities 
(explaining, for example, why people write and trust online product reviews (Rhodes, 
2009)). 
Another example of strong cooperative norms increasing aggregate economic 
welfare is open-source software.  In open-source software the source code is available for 
free, which allows users to change and distribute it.  The software is developed 
collaboratively, with each user improving it for the good of the public. The norm among 
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the users of open-source software is that an individual will fix a mistake or add useful 
content even if the personal payoff does not justify the cost in time and energy.  This is 
partly because supporters know that others will do the same and overall they will benefit 
from useful software.  This type of collaboration is only possible where there are strong 
norms of digital cooperation. 
The same is true for the online encyclopedia Wikipedia, which is written 
collaboratively “by the people who use it” (Wikipedia: Introduction).  People are 
constantly changing Wikipedia, writing new entries and editing written ones.  
Wikipedia’s site says that it is “a special type of website designed to make collaboration 
easy” (ibid.).  As with open-source software, people contribute even if the individual 
benefit they receive from making these edits does not compensate them personally for 
their costs.  This collaboration exists because people feel strong norms of digital 
cooperation. 
We can also consider examples of digital cooperation encouraging fairness and 
justice in e-commerce.  Online ratings increase the amount of quality information 
available about products, buyers, and sellers (Dobrescu, Luca & Motta, 2013), 
contributing to fairness in e-commerce.  These ratings also increase accountability, 
encouraging online sellers to accurately describe their products and buyers to pay on time 
and in full, lest they suffer negative ratings.  This mechanism often acts in place of the 
courts to ensure justice for online purchasers and sellers.  Although users are not required 
to rate the products they buy or their interactions with the buyers or sellers, many often 
do, contributing to the cooperative effort of increasing online justice and fairness.  
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Whether they are dealing with handling social dilemmas, creating “spontaneous 
sociability,” minimizing transaction costs, or increasing accountability, norms of 
cooperation and trust can help online communities grow their aggregate economic 
welfare and promote fairness.  Therefore, under the rubric of ISCT, microsocial norms of 
trust and cooperation can be legitimate norms, supporting the hypernorm of necessary 
social efficiency. 
 
Why People Trust and Cooperate 
In addition to the sociologists and behavioral scientists whose work supports the 
argument that trust and cooperation are part of the hypernorm of necessary social 
efficiency, many philosophers also describe trust and cooperation as emerging in society 
as a way to improve social life; in essence, they discuss the role of trust and cooperation 
in efficiently providing necessary goods.  Trust and cooperation are necessary because 
they direct society towards the common good (Michalos, 1990) by encouraging pro-
social behavior (Ims and Jakobsen, 2006) and allowing people to efficiently achieve 
social objectives (Horsburgh, 1961). 
Two cycles of trust and cooperation explain how society develops these norms.  
People become trustworthy so that other people will trust them (Gauthier, 1986).  When 
an individual knows that other people want to be trusted, and that they therefore will act 
with trustworthiness, it makes rational sense for the individual to trust them (Pettit, 1995).  
This in turn encourages people to be more trustworthy so they will continue to be trusted.  
In this way, people become more trustworthy from being trusted.  This idea appears in 
the Babylonian Talmud as well, which describes how the benefit a person receives from 
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being publicly trusted (as a guarantor) creates his obligation to be trustworthy 
(Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 176b). 
The effectiveness of the first cycle of trust in promoting social welfare relies on a 
second cycle: trust and cooperation as communal norms.  Without norms of trust and 
cooperation, people won’t trust and cooperate, and then they will not develop norms of 
trust and cooperation.  The opposite circle is true as well.  If people trust and cooperate, 
others will feel that they too should trust and cooperate (Hollis, 1998; Pettit, 1995).  This 
encourages people to trust and cooperate more, in part because they think it will make 
others act more trustworthy and cooperative (Jones, 1996). This cycle leads to norms of 
trust and cooperation.  Knowing that our activities are governed by trust norms, that we 
will quickly be able to decipher those norms, and that other people involved in our 
activities will act in accordance with those norms (Becker, 1996), people will follow 
those norms and be trusting, trustworthy, and cooperative. This enhances the individual’s 
sense of security (Becker, 1996) and encourages greater social welfare (Horsburgh, 1961; 
Ims and Jakobsen, 2006; Michalos 1990). 
 
Figure 1: Cycle of Trust Norms 
 
Using this cycle we also see that trust norms help promote fairness and justice, 
necessary social goods under ISCT.  People in this cycle learn to act in a trustworthy 
manner and in return expect to be beneficiaries of trustworthy behavior.  When trust 
norms are strong there is reciprocity in the cycle creating a system of fairness and justice. 
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Understanding the progression of norms of trust and cooperation in efficient 
society is useful not only to explain how we got to where we are – a state of 
psychological prominence for trust and cooperation (Halevy and Chou, 2013) – but also 
to explain the importance of these norms in efficiently providing for society’s necessary 
goods, namely aggregate economic welfare, fairness and justice.  In this way, trust and 
cooperation norms are instantiations of the efficiency hypernorm Donaldson and Dunfee 
describe and therefore imply moral obligations to abide by these norms. 
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Digital Trust and Cooperation-Building Norms 
 
In section 2 I demonstrated that ISCT provides a foundation for understanding 
moral behavior in digital communities.  In section 3 I illustrated how norms of trust and 
cooperation are an instantiation of the efficiency hypernorm, and therefore are morally 
prescribed by ISCT.  It follows that digital communities are bound by the efficiency 
hypernorm, and that individuals in digital communities are morally obligated to promote 
trust and cooperation.  Below I explain how the social efficiency hypernorm allows moral 
free space for microsocial norms and that many digital communities have already 
developed digital microsocial norms that support trust and cooperation. 
 
Moral Free Space 
Donaldson and Dunfee explain moral free space as “the area bounded by 
hypernorms in which communities develop ethical norms representing a collective 
viewpoint concerning right behavior” (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999:83).  These ethical 
norms can be expressed as formal rules or as unwritten, implicit agreements among 
groups of people.  By creating room for microsocial ethical norms, moral free space: 
 (1) enables organizations to deal with the opaqueness that results from 
bounded moral rationality, (2) allows communities to reflect (within 
important limits such as hypernorms) their own chosen values and 
preferences, (3) provides for variances reflecting a world of enormous 
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diversity, and (4) allows communities to develop ethical norms enabling 
efficient achievement of core goals. (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999:86) 
Above I illustrated that online norms of trust and cooperation are supported by the 
hypernorm of necessary social efficiency, as well as other moral considerations.  This 
support allows moral free space in which digital communities can develop ethical norms 
that are bounded by hypernorms.  The specific practices that support trust and 
cooperation online fall into the category of microsocial norms created by this moral free 
space. 
 
Digital Microsocial Norms 
Most of the online communities that facilitate internet communication for 
business-related communication and activities publish formal norms.  Many of these rules 
exist to support trust-building and cooperation within the community.  For example, 
buyers and sellers on eBay (a consumer-to-consumer shopping website) are told not to 
misrepresent their identity or falsely report on another eBay member.  These rules are 
formally part of eBay’s Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, which states that “we 
believe that an honest, open environment can bring out the best in people” (eBay). 
Other websites that view themselves as online communities also specify formal 
norms which help maintain trust and cooperation among group members.  Reddiquette 
(an etiquette list for Reddit, a social networking and news site) requests of people: 
“Please don’t conduct personal attacks on other commenters” or offer to exchange gifts 
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for votes
5
 on the site (Reddit, a).  Craigslist (a classified advertisement website) also 
prohibits misleading or deceptive content, as well as offensive or obscene postings 
(Craigslist). 
Informal digital norms also exist for these types of communities, though their 
informal nature makes them difficult to pinpoint.  However some anecdotal examples 
come to mind: Reddit users developed a norm of authentically upvoting or downvoting 
items based on their interest level.  The authenticity of this voting system is entirely 
voluntary, but the results show a truthful reflection of what users find interesting.  
Similarly Craig Newmark, the founder of Craigslist, pointed out that his site works not 
because of formal rules but because “there is a culture of trust on the site” created 
through informal rules (Pennace, 2005).  There is also experimental research showing the 
development of online norms, particularly in virtual teams (e.g. Glikson and Erez, 2013). 
Donaldson and Dunfee’s understanding of the importance of moral free space 
illuminates the formal and informal norms created by online communities.  Moral free 
space (1) enables online groups to appreciate specific ramifications of bounded moral 
rationality, (2) allows online communities to determine what values are most important 
for their needs, (3) provides for variances reflecting an online world with enormous 
diversity, and (4) allows online communities to develop ethical norms which help them 
achieve their core goals. 
 
                                                             
 
5
 On Reddit’s social networking site users post submissions and other users vote those 
submissions “up” or “down” which then affects the submission’s placement on Reddit’s 
page. 
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Authentic Online Norms 
According to Donaldson and Dunfee’s criteria, an ethical norm is authentic when 
“a substantial majority of the membership holds the attitude that a particular behavior is 
right (wrong) and a substantial majority act consistently with that attitude” (Donaldson & 
Dunfee, 1999:102).  While we do not have data about whether microsocial online norms 
encouraging trust and cooperation are believed to be right according to a substantial 
majority of a particular community, we do have anecdotal evidence that people in the 
communities mentioned above tend to stick to the norms, and thus create “a culture of 
trust.” 
We also have empirical evidence of certain trust-building behaviors in specific 
circumstances.  When participants in an online study were asked to chat with each other 
as part of an exercise, only 2 of the 102 conversations included any form of cursing, 
which can be considered a signal of uncooperative online behavior (as discussed in “Why 
the F* Don’t They Trust” in this dissertation).  In contrast, almost all of the participants 
(93 percent) employed trust-building norms such as opening the conversation politely.  
While this doesn’t provide evidence about the authenticity of norms in specific online 
communities, it does show that online users can be inclined to follow trust and 
cooperation-building norms. 
In order for an authentic norm to be considered a legitimate norm in Donaldson 
and Dunfee’s framework it must not conflict with hypernorms.  I already discussed how 
norms promoting trust and cooperation are an instantiation of the efficiency hypernorm.  
I’ve also shown that other potential sources of hypernorms (such as virtue ethics or 
Kantian duties) allow moral free space for the development of trust-building and 
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cooperative microsocial online norms.  In addition, online trust and cooperation and the 
norms that support them do not necessarily conflict with what Donaldson and Dunfee 
refer to as “collective agreement” hypernorms – agreements reached by people from 
different communities about basic rights – such as the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999:69).  There are times when 
microsocial norms of trust and cooperation can be used for illegitimate purposes, such as 
the Silk Road’s use of strong trusting online relationships to arrange for illegal drug sales 
and other nefarious ends (Ball, 2013).  In these circumstances, trusting norms would not 
be legitimate moral norms.  Despite this, for many online business communities norms of 
trust and cooperation can be authentic, legitimate norms used to build efficiency and to 
work towards legitimate moral ends. 
 
Conclusion 
Kracher and Corritore (2004) argue that the burgeoning field of digital business 
ethics needs research on trust as a value in e-commerce.  Answering their call, I asked: 
What is the digital business person’s responsibility to promote digital trust and 
cooperation? I answer that the individual is morally responsible to follow authentic norms 
of trust and cooperation developed in digital communities.  I approached this conclusion 
by using ISCT as a basis for understanding moral responsibility in digital business 
activities.  As part of this discussion I expanded the reach of Donaldson and Dunfee’s 
concept of community to include digital communities of people who conduct business-
related communication and activities together.  I then used the ISCT framework to show 
that trust and cooperation are an instantiation of the hypernorm of necessary social 
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efficiency, and that authentic microsocial norms developed for the ends of trust and 
cooperation carry moral responsibility.  I then gave a glimpse of the importance of 
microsocial norms of trust and cooperation for digital business. 
With this paper I aim to contribute to the discussion of digital business ethics by 
analyzing what makes the digital world unique from many other business environments – 
increased risk and diversity – and showing that these factors do not detract from 
individuals’ ethical responsibilities online.  Instead, individuals participating in digital 
commerce have a responsibility to follow trust and cooperation norms developed by 
digital communities.  I do not discuss whether the digital business person has an 
obligation to aid in formation of these norms, and I see this as an area for future research. 
To fully understand and appreciate the individuals’ responsibilities in this matter, 
and to uncover the importance and nature of digital microsocial norms, we need empirical 
research on the causes and effects of digital trust and cooperation and on the microsocial 
norms developed by digital communities.  Empirical research can elucidate what these 
norms are, how and why they affect trust and cooperation, and how to encourage the 
development of pro-social digital norms. 
The next two papers in this dissertation begin to uncover empirical findings in this 
area by analyzing factors which create greater digital trust and cooperation.  In these 
papers I look at how particular circumstances such as age and experience with digital 
communication affect behavior with digital media and how certain controllable digital 
behaviors such as style and length of digital texts affect trust and cooperation.  I also 
discuss one particular online microsocial norm – online civility – and its affect on trust 
and cooperation in digital communities.  In the following papers I discuss some of the 
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many examples of how the way people communicate digitally affects their ability to 
create trust and cooperation; future research can continue this endeavor, in an attempt to 
understand the digital environment and to create more trusting and cooperative digital 
communities. 
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Figure 
Figure 1: Cycle of Trust Norms 
 
  
A & B trust and 
are trustworthy
C feels that he 
should trust A & B 
and cooperate 
with them
A & B continue to 
trust and 
cooperate
Norms of trust 
and cooperation 
develop for A, B, 
& C
A, B, & C follow 
norms of trust 
and cooperation
A wants trust so 
acts trustworthy
B trusts A
A knows that if she 
acts trustworthy, B 
will trust her
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NEGOTIATING WITH THE MILLENNIAL GENERATION 
 
“Every great movement in the history of Western civilization from the Carolingian Age 
to the nineteenth century has been an international movement which owed its existence 
and its development to the cooperation of many different peoples.” 
-Christopher Dawson, Historian 1889–1970 
 
“Dude, I Think I Forgot How to Talk.” 
-Danielle Williams, Blogger, b. 1991 
 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Cooperation and Trust 
Background.  Cooperation can be viewed through various moral lenses.  
Corporations may cooperate to raise prices; lobbyists and politicians can cooperate to 
impair democratic values.  Despite these unethical uses of cooperation, society benefits 
from a behavioral norm of cooperation.  With this norm, communities can provide more 
collective goods and experience higher group welfare (Hollander, 1990).  In social 
dilemmas, cooperation can often prevent individual rationality from leading to collective 
irrationality (Kollock, 1998).  Additionally, having generalized norms of cooperation 
encourages participation in social exchanges, and motivates people to contribute to 
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knowledge exchange, making cooperative norms a “foundation of the creation of 
intellectual capital,” (Lesser 2000, Putnam, 1993). 
 Trust is a critical factor in cooperative relationships (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 
1994).  In order to have successful cooperation, parties need a mutually rewarding 
exchange relationship (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  Many cooperative situations, (such as 
modeled by the prisoner’s dilemma,) involve an exchange where each party will be 
harmed by investing unless the other parties also invest.  To be willing to commit to this 
relationship, each party must believe that the others will also commit to the exchange.   
This involves a belief that others will not act with intentional acts of deceit.  The 
willingness to act on this belief is trust.  In this paper we discuss this form of trust, 
described by Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer (1998) as the “willingness to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations about another’s behavior.” 
In order to have a cooperative community, individuals must trust each other.  
They must also display trustworthy behavior – actions which do not intentionally harm a 
vulnerable trustee (Schweitzer, Hershey & Bradlow (2006).   
 
Communal norms of trust and cooperation.  Societal norms of trust are necessary 
for promoting society’s aims.  Putnam (1995) describes social capital as aspects of social 
life that facilitate communities to act together more effectively in pursuing collective 
goals.  Examples of these “social connections” in Putnam’s work include norms of 
cooperation and trust.  Trust promotes cooperation, which in turn promotes greater social 
capital.  Cohen and Prusak (2001) outline this relationship: 
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Trust is the one essential lubricant to any and all social activities… In the 
event of conflict, trust is essential, as failed attempts at negotiation 
between countries and ethnic or religious groups sometimes painfully 
demonstrate.  Trust is basic to human society…  The relationships, 
communities, cooperation, and mutual commitment that characterize 
social capital could not exist without a reasonable level of trust…  We see 
trust as a necessary condition of social capital, and its natural starting 
point. (Page 29) 
 
The social capital Cohen and Prusak discuss is linked with economic growth 
(Whiteley, 2000) and can increase the advantages of investments in physical and human 
capital (Cerreta, 2003).  Researchers also associate social capital with lower transaction 
costs and faster innovation (Putnam, 1993).  
Social capital generated through trust and cooperation is particularly important to 
the online community.  Companies need trusting relationships with suppliers, 
distributors, customers, and complementary businesses (Ozer, 2005).  People on all sides 
of online dealings need to trust that the other parties are truthful and sincere in order to 
engage in safe, meaningful interactions (Herring, 2002).  In order to develop successful 
online communities and marketplaces, everyone from computer programmers to retailers 
and customers needs to cooperate in mutually rewarding exchange relationships; in other 
words, they need to provide for others and expect that others will compensate and 
provide for them. 
For example, open-source software has benefited from strong cooperative norms.  
In open-source software the source code is available for free which allows users to 
change and distribute it.  The software is developed collaboratively, with each user 
improving it for the good of the public. The norm among the users of open-source 
software is that an individual will fix a mistake or add useful content even if the personal 
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payoff does not justify the cost in time and energy.  This is because supporters know that 
others will do the same and overall they will benefit from useful software.  This type of 
collaboration is only possible where there are strong norms of cooperation. 
 
Communication and Cooperation 
Literature review.  Many researchers have shown the benefits of communication 
in negotiations.  Valley, Moag and Bazerman (1998) write that, “Communication impels 
negotiators to incorporate elements of honest information exchange, cooperation and trust 
into their negotiation strategies, thus allowing mutually beneficial agreements.”   Daniel 
Balliet (2010) uses a meta-analytic review to show that in social dilemmas there is a large 
positive effect of communication on cooperation.  This research demonstrates that 
communication encourages adoption of joint cooperative behavior.  This paper develops 
this thesis further by exploring how a change in one aspect of communication – the 
medium – can change the adoption of cooperative behavior.  In particular, we show that 
despite prior research indicating a preference for face-to-face communication, people, 
(particularly Millennials,) can build trusting and cooperative relationships through digital 
communication. 
The effects of online communication have been studied over the last two decades.  
Most of these studies show that online communication is less useful in building 
relationships than in-person communication and that electronic media may impede the 
success of people working together (Erez et al., 2013).  These researchers fall into two 
categories.  Some identify a gap between the type and style of information conveyed 
digitally and the way people communicate in person (Trevino, Lengel & Daft, 1987; 
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Naquin & Paulson, 2003) which prohibits effective exchange of information.  Others 
focus on particular mechanisms which affect the interpersonal relationship between the 
negotiating parties, suggesting that participants in online negotiations have lower levels 
of trust in their counterparts (Naquin & Paulson, 2003) and that this mistrust is likely to 
result in a breakdown of negotiations (Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson & Morris, 1999). 
The first category of researchers question negotiators’ capabilities to effectively 
share information through digital media.  Some negotiations research suggests that people 
are less able to convey certain types of information online than they are in person 
(Naquin & Paulson, 2003).  However research from other disciplines indicates that online 
discussions may be more useful for group productivity (Gallupe, Bastianutti & Cooper, 
1991).  Additionally, recent education research (as well as anecdotal evidence of the 
prevalence of digital texting and emailing,) shows that people in the Millennial 
Generation often use these media as preferred forms of communication (Godwin-Jones 
2005), suggesting that there is nothing inherent in online communication itself which 
would slow the flow of information and inhibit cooperation. 
The second category is researchers who propose that online negotiations suffer 
from weaker trust mechanisms and lower rapport than in-person negotiations (Moore et 
al. 1999; Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg and Thompson, 2002).  Rapport, a “state of mutual 
positivity and interest” is connected to cooperation and information-sharing in 
negotiations (Nadler, 2003) and is more difficult to develop through digital 
communication (Moore et al. 1999; Morris et al. 2002).  This approach suggests that the 
most significant barrier to successful collaborative negotiations online (versus in-person) 
is the ability to develop a relationship of mutual understanding and goals.  If such a 
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relationship exists prior to the negotiation, then online and in-person negotiations should 
not be significantly different from one another.  Additionally these theories suggest that 
people who are accustomed to developing thoughtful relationships online will be able to 
negotiate collaboratively. 
Researchers in this category also suggest that communication media contribute to 
different levels of truth-telling and trust and are therefore critical determinants in the 
efficiency and distribution of negotiations outcomes (Valley, Moag & Bazerman, 1998).  
However digital communication is more easily recorded and referenced than face-to-face 
communication and may therefore elicit more truthfulness and give online remarks more 
reliability, in turn making these conversations more trustworthy.  Indeed more recent 
research shows that communication via email is more likely to elicit truth-telling than 
face-to-face interactions and that instant messaging has the same truth-power as face-to-
face communication (Hancock, Thom-Santelli & Ritchie, 2004). 
One theory which crosses these two categories is that e-mail inhibits the process 
of exchanging personal information which is necessary for relationship-building (Morris, 
Nadler, Kurtzberg and Thompson, 2002).  Researchers of online dating have been 
particularly interested in this issue.  Gibbs, Ellison, and Lai (2011) noted that online 
daters deal with problems of wariness of disclosure of personal information, and 
trustworthiness of others’ information.  If this information is not shared in a trusting 
manner, it can be an obstacle to relationship development.  Gibbs notes: 
As online technologies, and the communicative affordances they offer, 
become central in many individuals’ social practices and daily 
experiences, privacy concerns – what to disclose, to whom, and how to 
ensure that others are disclosing honesty in return – are increasingly 
salient… This is especially true in contexts such as online dating, where 
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individuals often initiate relationships with people they do not know in 
offline contexts… The lack of shared physical context and nonverbal cues 
can create greater uncertainty about others and complicate the process of 
forming relationships” (Gibbs, Ellison and Lai, 2011). 
 
These same researchers, while noting potential difficulties in developing trusting online 
relationships, also point out that online daters develop behaviors which reduce 
uncertainty and verify others’ credibility (Gibbs et al, 2011).  It is these mechanisms 
which allow dating sites to promote relationships. 
While a relationship in a business negotiation is not the same as a dating 
relationship, similar principles apply.  When people negotiate using digital messages, 
they lack the physical context and nonverbal cues often used to help verify truthfulness, 
encourage them to share personal information, and build relationships.  However, people 
communicating digitally replace those cues with new ones gleaned from the language, 
style, and content of the messages.  
 
Millennial communication.  Communication, especially among people born 
between 1982 and 2005, known as the Millennial Generation (Howe and Strauss, 2007), 
is focused heavily on text messages, emails, digital social media, and online chats.  We 
see young people’s comfort with digital messaging anecdotally at every corner – at bars, 
people use text messages to pick-up potential dates (Stein, 2011); during tough times 
people use texts for emotional support (Persch, 2008).  Texting, email, and online chats 
have become such important parts of peoples’ lives that some religious young adults find 
it difficult to stop even if it means breaking religious law (Goldberg and Pelcovitz, 2011) 
or texting during sermons (Voltattorni, 2011).  Some people are so addicted to text 
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messaging that they sleep with their phones under their pillows so as not to miss a single 
message (Lohmann, 2011) and others experience texting-related thumb pain (Hafner, 
2009). 
 This anecdotal evidence forces us to question the accepted doctrine that people 
are more comfortable speaking in person than they are communicating with written 
messages.  In 1998, Valley, Moag and Bazerman published a study showing that parties 
in written negotiations found it difficult to establish a basis of trust, when compared to 
people negotiating in-person or on the phone.  This study was conducted less than twenty 
years ago, but in that short time its implications may have become less pertinent for the 
new generations of communicators.  Similarly outdated are the studies Valley and 
colleagues cite from the 1950s to the 1980s showing that face-to-face communication 
increases the likelihood of cooperation.  Among U.S. 13-17 year-olds who send an 
average of 3,417 text messages a month, and 18-34 year-olds who send 2,842 a month 
(Nielsen 2011), many believe there to be strong communication using written digital 
messages.  The strength of this communication among Millennials and other people 
comfortable with digital media is evident when we look at the success of virtual teams 
(Erez et al., 2013) and online support groups (Stephen et al., 2014). 
This change in communication behavior calls into question many of the accepted 
wisdoms regarding conflict resolution.  In this paper we seek to uproot the notion that 
face-to-face communication is best for developing trusting and cooperative relationships, 
and show that in today’s society digital communication can be useful for these ends.   
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Empirical Hypotheses Development 
 
Millennial Communication 
 As discussed above, there is significant anecdotal evidence that Millennials prefer 
digital communication over in-person discussions.  Before understanding how Millennials 
use digital communication we test this hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1.  Millennials prefer digital communication over face-to-face 
communication. 
 
Millennial Cooperation 
Cooperation is learned socially, and can be developed in different ways.  The 
culture of the Millennial Generation cultivated cooperation through online messages and 
the like, perhaps even more than it has encouraged that type of trust in face-to-face 
discussions.  Furthermore, because of the strong role that email and digital texts play in 
the culture of the Millennial Generation (Bryant et al 2006), these users are even more 
accustomed to sharing information online, and to picking up on cues about when that 
information is trustworthy.  Millennials experienced a socialization of using digital 
communication for sharing information and developing relationships, and are therefore 
well-equipped to use emails and texting for trusting, relationship-building, and 
cooperative ends. 
Howe and Strauss (2007) describe the Millennial Generation: “As the first 
generation to grow up with mobile digital technology, Millennials expect nonstop 
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interaction with their peers in forms that would have been unimaginable to prior 
generations of young adults. They will develop new standards for social networking, 
identifying a clear range of acceptable online attitudes and behaviors.” The purpose of the 
empirical studies in this paper is to identify and understand these new standards. 
This discussion of Millennials is consistent with the accepted literature regarding 
the use of communication in solving social dilemmas.  Messick and Brewer (1983) 
suggested four reasons why communication increases cooperation.  They write that 
through communication: 
1. Individuals can learn information about the choices others are likely to 
make. 
2. Group members can make explicit commitments about what they will do. 
3. People can persuade others about the morally “right” thing to do. 
4. People can feel a stronger sense of group identity. 
 
Each of these reasons can retain its effectiveness given the socialization of Millennials as 
digital communicators: 
1. People who are accustomed to sharing information about themselves and 
their plans using digital communication (Hypothesis 1) can share and learn about 
the choices others are likely to make. 
2. Digital commitments are recorded and searchable, and therefore can be 
even more reliable than spoken commitments. 
3. Moral arguments can be made digitally.  People can, and do discuss issues 
of ethics and morality through digital texts and online forums.  (For example, the 
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social news site Reddit has an entire section devoted to discussing ethics and its 
application to current events.)  Furthermore, since online arguer has a chance to 
think about the issues before they type, they may make clearer arguments.  The 
reader also has more time to read and consider the arguments than if they were 
made verbally. 
4. People can connect through sharing emails, texts, and instant messages, in 
a way which reinforces their group identity as digital communicators.  
Additionally, in some contexts digital communication gives people a greater sense 
of safety, allowing them to share more online (Stephen et al., 2014). 
 
Messick and Brewer’s (1983) arguments for why communication encourages 
cooperation apply just as well to Millennials who use digital communication.  Therefore 
we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2.  For Millennials, online messaging is at least as effective in 
encouraging cooperation as face-to-face communication. 
 
As discussed above, a critical aspect of cooperation is the development of 
cooperative norms.  Therefore we look not only at the short-term effects of cooperation 
immediately following communication, but also at the development of cooperative norms 
for a group.  Here too we expect that communication will advance the development of 
cooperative norms.  For Millennials who are accustomed to developing social norms 
through digital media: 
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Hypothesis 3.  In the long term, online messages encourage more 
cooperation than in-person communication. 
 
 Similarly, we expect that by using and getting comfortable with digital 
communication, people learn about cooperative and trusting norms that emerge over 
these media.  In particular, people who experience trustworthiness through digital 
communication learn that these norms exist. 
 
Hypothesis 4.  People learn to trust using digital communication 
through repeated digital interactions with positive feedback. 
 
Non-Millennial Cooperation 
While Millennials are accustomed to communicating through digital media, 
people born before this time (for the most part) were not raised to trust and cooperate 
online to the degree that they trust and cooperate in-person.  Therefore, although we 
hypothesize that online messaging will encourage cooperation among Millennials, we do 
not necessarily expect this effect in non-Millennials.  In general, we assume that 
Millennials are comfortable with digital communication and will therefore be able to 
build trusting and cooperative relationships through that media.  We expect this effect to 
apply similarly to non-Millennials who are also comfortable communicating digitally.  
On the other hand, people who are not comfortable with this media will find it more 
difficult to build  trusting and cooperative online relationships. 
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Hypothesis 5.  For people who are comfortable 
communicating digitally, online messaging is effective in 
encouraging trust. 
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Empirical Studies 
 
Study 1 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Millennials conduct a great deal of their 
communication digitally.  In study 1 we test this assumption, exploring how Millennials 
communicate with each other and whether the mode of communication affects their 
ability to build trusting relationships. 
 
Method 
Participants were recruited to a behavioral lab.  They read an article about a 
physician whose patient tells him he committed a crime.  The participants were then 
paired with each other and chatted with their partners for five minutes.  On half of the 
days the study ran, participants spoke with their partners in person.  On the other half of 
the days, participants sent each other digital texts through an online texting system 
developed for this study.  (Participants chose a day to come to the lab which fit their 
schedules, not knowing that there were differences between the days.) 
Participants then played a trust game with the same partner.  The game is modeled 
after the investment game designed by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995).  One 
participant (the sender) in each pair received $3.  The sender then decides how much of 
the $3 to send to her teammate.  The teammate receives triple the amount of money the 
sender sent, and then decides how much of this to send back to the sender.  Participants 
were given full instructions on how to play the game, examples, and test questions. 
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This game was designed to test the extent to which self-interested rational thought 
guides human behavior and where trust plays an important role.  The prediction based on 
the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is that the sending participants would not 
send any money.  However what Berg et al. (1995) found was that 55 out of 60 times 
they did send money.  The authors explain that, “Subjects were willing to place a trust, by 
risking some amount of money, in the belief that there would be reciprocity.” 
In our study we measure trust using a continuous variable of how much money 
the senders send.  We compare the amounts sent by participants who spoke to their 
teammates in person with the amounts sent by participants who chatted digitally.  We 
also test the assumption made by Berg et al. (1995) that willingness to risk is based on a 
belief in reciprocity by explicitly asking participants how much money they expect to 
receive in return.  To verify the internal reliability of the trust game, we ask participants a 
series of questions regarding the trustworthiness of their teammates, based on Johnson-
George and Swap (1982) and Dunn and Schweitzer (2005). (See Appendix A.)  
Participants were also asked questions about their teammate’s competence and warmth 
(also termed “positive affect”) adapted from Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu (2002) and 
Dunn, Ruedy, and Schweitzer (2012), and rapport questions, adapted from Jap, Robertson 
and Hamilton (2011).  (See Appendices B-C.) 
We also asked participants to answer the question: 
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In general, I talk to my friends using (please rank from 1 being the most used to 8 being 
least used): Phone (talking), Texting, E-mail, Gchat,
6
 BBM,
7
 Facebook, In person, 
Skype/Video chat 
 
Results 
 Summary.  174 people participated in the study, aged 18-34, with an average age 
of 21.0. One participant did not complete the questions in the study and was not included 
in the analysis.  Four participants were over the age of 30 as of the date of the study 
(April, 2014).  Removing these age-outliers from the study did not significantly affect the 
results.  Fifty-five of the participants were male, 143 were raised in the United States, and 
145 were native English speakers. 
 
Communication Preference.  Most participants (51%) responded that in general, 
they talk to their friends using written digital communication.  Sixty-six participants cited 
texting as the way they communicate most with their friends, 17 answered Facebook, and 
7 replied either E-mail, Gchat, or BBM.  In contrast, 84 participants said they primarily 
communicate with their friends in-person, and 4 answered by phone (Hypothesis 1). 
Because this study was conducted in a behavioral lab, many of the participants 
(92%) were students.  Most of the students on this particular campus live either on-
campus or in off-campus housing nearby with other friends, meaning that these are 
                                                             
 
6
 Gchat is short for Google Chat – a texting service that appears on the Google Email 
page, as well as on smartphone applications. 
7
 BBM (BlackBerry Messenger) is a texting service for BlackBerry phones. 
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people who live in unusually close proximity to many of their friends.  They have 
roommates, hall mates, housemates, classmates, etc they can see in person very easily.  
Even so, these participants report that they primarily communicate with their friends via 
written digital communication. Given these results, we expect that Millennials who do 
not live in a campus college environment would prefer, a priori, to communicate with 
their peers digitally rather than in-person. 
 
 Difference between face-to-face and text.  There was no significant difference 
between the 45 participants who sent money after interacting face-to-face (averaged 
$2.36, standard deviation 0.88) and the 42 participants who sent money after interacting 
digitally (averaged $1.94, standard deviation 1.17).  Those who gave more than zero were 
asked how much they expect to receive in return.  Here too there was no significant 
difference between the groups, with those who interacted face-to-face expecting 47.3% 
return and those who interacted digitally expecting 43.0% return (p = 0.60) (Hypothesis 
2). 
 Although communication media did not play a role in how much the senders 
trusted the people in the receiver role, the latter were affected by the type of 
communication.  Those who communicated face-to-face returned 44.89% of what they 
received, whereas those who communicated digitally returned only 27.08%.  This issue is 
not about trust, but rather about reciprocity; responses to the trust questionnaire did not 
predict the percentage participants in this role sent back (p = 0.14), however rapport and 
positive affect were significant indicators for the percentage returned (p < 0.05).  This 
indicates that although the senders who communicated digitally trusted their counterparts 
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just as much as senders who communicated in person, the digital counterparts did not 
reciprocate. 
 
Table A1. Difference between face-to-face and digital texts in trust game outcomes 
  
Manipulation Check.  The money given in the trust game can be explained by the 
amount those participants expected to receive in return (p < 0.05), as well as by their 
responses to the surveys of trust (p < 0.01), rapport (p = 0.001) and positive affect (p < 
0.05). 
 
Table A2.  Correlation of money sent in trust game with trust, rapport, and positive 
affect survey responses 
 
Discussion 
 In study 1 we found support for our hypothesis that Millennials prefer digital 
communication over face-to-face communication.  We also have some support that 
Millennials build trusting relationships just as well with digital communication as they do 
in person.  In the rest of the studies in this paper, we analyze this relationship more 
closely, looking for further support for this hypothesis in different settings and for a 
greater understanding of the effects of digital communication on trust building. 
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Study 2 
Method 
Background.  Study 1 provided support for our hypothesis that Millennials build 
trusting relationships with digital communication at least as well as they do with face-to-
face communication.  Previously (in the theoretical section of this paper) we discussed 
the relationship between trust and cooperation, positing that trust is necessary for 
cooperation in certain situations, such as the prisoner’s dilemma (Morgan and Hunt, 
1994; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994).  In study 2 we use a game modeled after the 
prisoner’s dilemma to see whether the strength of digital communication in developing 
trust (as we saw in study 1) will apply to developing cooperation as well.  In this study 
we ask: given that Millennials who communicate digitally trust more than Millennials 
who communicate face-to-face, will they cooperate more as well? 
Much prior research on communication media (including our study 1)  in 
negotiations uses laboratory settings (Valley et al. 1998) or arrangements where the 
participants meet their counterparts for the first time during the negotiation (Moore, 
Kurtzberg, Thompson & Morris, 1999; Naquin & Paulson, 2003).  Study 1 followed this 
model in which the “getting-to-know-you” stage of the negotiators is part of the 
negotiation itself.  The two parties have only the tested mode of communication to build 
rapport and develop trust.  Additionally, the parties in a lab-based negotiation are 
unlikely to see each other after the study.  Thus they are not interested in building long-
term relationships. 
Most business negotiations involve people who have ongoing relationships, which 
begin before the negotiation takes place and continue for long after the negotiation 
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(Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Sirdeshmukh, Singh, & Sabol, 2002; Webster, 1992).  These 
types of actual relationships are difficult to mimic in a lab.  Additionally, the implicit 
variability in individuals’ concern for certain relationships and not for others, because of 
personal preferences (e.g. they like one person more) or expected utility from the 
relationship (e.g. they believe this person might be able to get them a job,) cannot 
possibly be replicated in a fabricated setting. 
Instead, for study 2 we used a negotiation to test the hypothesis in a situation 
where individuals have ongoing relationships with the other participants, and where there 
is a natural variation in allegiance to those relationships.  The data in analysis are from a 
game played by undergraduate and MBA students at the Wharton School of the 
University of Pennsylvania. 
There is variation in the strength of these relationships, as different classes play 
the game at different points in the semester, and individuals within the classes had 
different experiences with others before this game, and often have relationships with the 
same people external to the class setting.  In many ways this setting mimics the reality of 
many business negotiations.  Reality may put old friends at opposite sides of the table, or 
might compel people who had negotiated with each other previously to interact again. 
These data focus on a specific age group – those who were undergraduate or 
MBA students between 2003 and 2010, which means that most participants were born 
between 1980 and the early 1990s, putting most of them in the Millennial Generation 
(Howe and Strauss, 2007).  This allows us to understand more about the way a generation 
heavily influenced by modern technology communicates. 
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Design.  The game is a negotiation which is a simulation of OPEC decision 
making, designed by Maurice Schweitzer and run by the Wharton Learning Lab 
(Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania).  Each “world” consists of 3 “countries.”  
Countries usually have 2-4 members.  Each country sits in a different room with a 
computer screen.  Each country simultaneously decides how much oil to produce for that 
round.  Participants are then told the results of the round, and play another round.  All 
countries are given the same profit function, which depends on the quantity which that 
individual country produced and the price per barrel.  Profit = Qi(P-C).  Marginal cost 
(C) is constant.  The price is decided based on total production of the world (the more 
produced, the lower the price).  The goal for each country is to maximize profits.  (See 
Appendix E for full instructions.) 
The profit-maximizing production for each world is 38 million barrels per country 
per round.  If all three countries in a world produce at this level, the resulting price is 
$35.80 per barrel.  Transcripts of messages sent between countries, as well as discussions 
with the students indicate that the students immediately recognize 38 million as the 
cooperative production level. 
Each round the students saw a screen summarizing the world’s activities in prior 
rounds (Appendix F).  After they play the game, the students analyze the results together 
with the professor and the rest of the class.  In approximately 95% of the classes, students 
are graded on the outcome of the results.  Professors and students from the graded and 
ungraded classes say anecdotally that students take the game very seriously. 
 
71 
Independent variables.  The number of rounds (between eight and twenty-five) 
and simulation events are decided by the professors prior to the game.  These details are 
not given to the students before the game.  They do not know how many rounds of the 
game will be played.  They do know how much time is allotted for the game, and the 
final round is announced before their final round decisions.  The control variables include 
round number, whether it is the final round, and various simulation events.  Two of these 
are communication events: 
 Countries may send short digital messages to other countries in their world. 
 Countries send representatives to an in-person meeting with the other country 
representatives from their world. 
 
Dependent variable.  The OPEC simulation presents a prisoner’s dilemma in 
which the countries can defect by producing at a high level (thereby decreasing the world 
price while increasing the country’s profit) or cooperate by producing at a low level 
(thereby increasing the world price). 
We measure behavior using price per world in each round following a simulation 
event.  Since the price incorporates the individual countries’ production, focusing on 
price simplifies the analysis, allowing us to look at 427 worlds instead of 1,281 individual 
countries.  The more cooperative the countries are, the closer each country’s production 
will be to 38 barrels, and the closer the price will be to $35.80.  When countries defect, 
they produce more barrels (for higher individual country profitability, at the expense of 
world profitability).  The higher total production for the country, the lower the price will 
be in that round.  Thus higher price indicates greater cooperation. 
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Results 
Summary Statistics.  This game was played 621 times by Millennials between 
2003 and 2010 in undergraduate and MBA classes at Wharton.  Only games with at least 
one round of each communication type, (face-to-face communication, computer 
messaging, and no-communication,) were included in the analysis.  Games with missing 
data (57) or without all communication types (67) were excluded.  Games played by 
groups other than MBAs and undergraduate students were also excluded (70).  There 
were 427 worlds, (1,281 individual countries,) in the remaining set that had both 
messaging and face-to-face rounds. 
 Each game consisted of 8-25 rounds.  The average price per barrel was $23.75, 
with the first round average of $24.72 and the last round average of $16.36.  The 
minimum price in the game was -3.41
8
 and the maximum price was $46.80
9
.  Of the 
5,666 rounds played among the 427 worlds, 6% had prices at or above the profit-
maximizing $35.80 and 2% had prices below the marginal production cost ($1). 
 
Behavioral Measure.  We regressed price per country in each round as a 
continuous dependent variable.   The control variables include round number, whether it 
                                                             
 
8
 Negative prices were allowed in this game.  A price of -3.41 means that the countries 
lost $4.41 (the price and the marginal cost of $1) for each barrel they produced.  It 
indicates a global production level close to the maximum production possible in the 
game. 
9
 The $46.80 price is above maximum profitability, as all countries could be producing 
more for a lower price and higher profitability. 
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is the final round, and various simulation events, including the two types of 
communication (in-person and digital messaging) which occur before the round starts. 
Other simulation events include whether after the round countries will find out the 
individual country production for the round, or only the total worldwide production.  This 
usually changes mid-game, and participants are told before the round what details will be 
revealed.  Another simulation is whether a fourth computer-generated country will be 
producing in the world, which produces a random but small number of barrels.  The 
students are told before the fourth country enters.  The effects of these variables, as well 
as the two communication variables of interest (messages and face-to-face 
communication,) are shown in Table B1. 
 
Table B1.  Undergraduate and MBA OLS Regression on Price 
 
The results in Table B1 show that when participants are allowed to send messages 
to each other they cooperate significantly more than in other rounds.  That is why there 
are higher prices during the rounds immediately following the messaging, as compared to 
rounds with no communication (significant at the p < 0.001 level).  Face-to-face 
communication also corresponds to higher prices; however this effect is significantly 
weaker than the messaging effect.  (There is a 0.73 increase in price for rounds following 
face-to-face communication as opposed to 4.10 for messages.)  These results indicate that 
the rounds preceded by one-line messages over the computer elicited more cooperative 
behavior (lower production, higher prices, and higher profits,) than the rounds preceded 
by in-person communication (Hypothesis 2).  This effect remains significant even when 
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controlling for other simulation events, such as whether participants were given 
individual-level output figures and whether a fourth country was included, as detailed 
above. 
 
Likelihood of cooperation.  In addition to the regression outputs looking at price 
as a continuum, we can also think of cooperation in terms of the likelihood of a “good 
price.”  The profit-maximizing price is $35.80, and prices above $34 or $35 indicate 
significant levels of cooperation among the three countries in the world.  To test the 
likelihood of achieving a cooperative price, we ran probit tests of the same data discussed 
above.  The results (in Table B2) show that worlds were significantly more likely to reach 
a “good price” of at least $34 [or $35] after a messaging round than they were after the 
in-person communication rounds. 
Specifically, worlds were 38.5% [37%] more likely to reach a price greater than 
or equal to $34 [$35] after messaging than they were in a round with no communication, 
whereas the face-to-face communication did not significantly impact the likelihood of a 
“good price.”  This provides further support for hypothesis 2. 
 
Table B2.  Undergraduate and MBA Probit: Likelihood of Non-Cooperation 
 
Medium-term effects.  There are a number of mechanisms which can explain 
these results.  It is possible that the arrangements made for cooperation during the 
messaging rounds are enacted immediately (in that round) while the cooperation 
prompted during in-person communication is more long-term.  This would be true if, for 
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example, the participants made arrangements during the face-to-face communication for 
short-term revenge and long-term cooperation (i.e. “This round one team can defect and 
then next round we will all cooperate,”) whereas the short messages are more 
straightforward (i.e. “All teams produce 38.”) 
The long-term nature of cooperation is not captured in ordinary least squares 
regression so to test this hypothesis we ran an event study.  This is a subset of regressions 
which allow us to analyze the mean effects of each communication type in the round 
immediately following the communication, and in the two and three rounds after 
communication.  The results are presented in Table B3. 
 
Table B3.  Undergraduate and MBA Event study showing mean abnormal price 
 
 Prices in the rounds immediately following messaging were significantly higher 
(by about $5.58) than the expected price in the absence of communication.  Furthermore, 
this effect lasted, although diminished, for two and three rounds after the messaging took 
place (with increases in prices averaging $4.56 over each of the three rounds).  The face-
to-face communication did not elicit similar price increases.  The first round after the 
face-to-face communication had no significant change (-0.04) from the expected price 
without the communication.  Although including the second round increased the observed 
cooperation after the face-to-face communication, the $1.13 average increase for two 
rounds and 59 cent increase for 3 rounds does not come close to the $5.51 and $4.56 
increases in the medium-term following the messaging rounds.  
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The results from the event study suggest that the messages encourage higher 
prices (greater cooperation) than face-to-face discussions, not only in the round 
immediately following communication, but even two and three rounds later.  This 
suggests that even if the in-person discussions elicit more long-term planning, they still 
do not elicit the same long-term cooperation as short online messages (Hypothesis 3). 
 
Generational Effect.  In this paper we suggest that digital messages are likely to 
elicit more cooperation than face-to-face communication, specifically for a population 
which is socialized to communicate trust and cooperation online and through text 
messages.  We therefore hypothesized (Hypothesis 2) that for participants in the 
Millennial Generation sending short messages will elicit at least as much cooperation as 
in-person communication.  We showed this in the analysis above, which included only 
participants who were MBA or undergraduate students during 2003-2010, most of whom 
are in the Millennial Generation.  In order to test whether this effect is only true for this 
age group, or whether it could apply to other constituencies as well, we analyzed data 
from Wharton’s Executive MBA classes during the same time period.  These participants 
played the same game, and in many ways are similar to the regular MBA students, aside 
from their age and experience.
10
 For the executive MBA participants, in-person 
communication encouraged greater cooperation (higher prices) than sending messages.  
This supports the idea that the strength of messaging in encouraging cooperation only 
                                                             
 
10
 The average age for starting the Wharton undergraduate program is 19, MBA 28, and 
Executive MBA 34 (Wharton Programs Comparison Table, 2011).  
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exists among people who have been socialized to trust and cooperate using online 
messaging – specifically, the Millennial Generation. 
The Executive MBA students showed slightly higher prices after the face-to-face 
interaction than in the message rounds, though this difference is not significant at the p < 
0.10 level.  What is significant is the difference between the cooperation after in-person 
communication among Executive MBAs and among the undergraduate/MBA group (p < 
0.05).  This suggests that the Executive MBAs and the undergraduate/MBA group use the 
face-to-face time differently, as it has different effects on the prices of the following 
rounds. 
 
Table B4.  Executive MBA OLS Regressions on Price 
 
Table B5.  Undergraduate, MBA and Executive MBA OLS Regressions on Price 
 
 
Limitations 
 It is possible that the distinction between the Executive MBA and the other 
student groups is related not to age, but rather to difference in negotiating skills and 
business experience more generally.  Here it is interesting to point out that the Executive 
MBA participants were overall less cooperative than the MBA and undergraduate 
students.  The average price for Executive MBA games was $19.26, as opposed to $23.75 
for the other students.  Additionally, 4% of the Executive MBA rounds had negative 
profitability (with a price below the marginal cost of $1) as opposed to 2% in the younger 
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group.  In any case, there may be other differences unrelated to age which account for the 
different effects of messaging and in-person communication. 
 An alternative explanation for the results of this study is that other differences 
between the types of communication affect success in encouraging cooperation.  
Messages are sent by all of the students in the country together (albeit with only one 
typist), whereas only one representative per country is sent to the face-to-face meeting.  
This issue requires further study to identify whether there is an agency effect which 
encourages lower production after in-person communication. 
Furthermore, in this data we do not record exact ages of each of the participants.  
We assume generalizations about which groups are Millennials based on the age 
information provided by the Wharton programs comparison table.  We also assume that 
the large sample size in this study makes the age outliers in each group less statistically 
relevant.  However additional research is needed to validate the difference between the 
age groups using more closely defined and differentiated age groups. 
 Even when taking into account the various limitations to this study, the analyses 
support the hypothesis that Millennials are more likely to cooperate when discussing joint 
strategy through short computer-based texts than they are when they discuss the strategy 
in-person. 
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Study 3 
 
Given the limitations of study 2 we conducted further studies in which each 
participant had a direct relationship with the person with whom they communicated, and 
where we collected data on age, gender, and other independent variables. Study 3 had a 
similar goal as studies 1 and 2 - to further understand the effects of digital 
communication on building trust and rapport.  In this study we surveyed students after 
they played a “house sale” game in their negotiations classes.  In this game, students in a 
negotiations class are randomly assigned to the roles of buyer, buyer’s agent, seller, or 
seller’s agent.  They are given an explanation of the house they want to buy/sell and the 
values of different household items and aspects of the house which can be negotiated as 
part of the sale.  For this negotiation, the buyer and seller are each only allowed to talk to 
their agents.  The agents are allowed to talk to each other and to their principals.  For 
many classes this game is played outside of the classroom, so the principals and agents 
talk to each other in whatever ways are easiest for them. 
 
Method 
We surveyed participants after they finalized the negotiation (either with a final 
sale or a decision not to buy/sell the house) but before they discuss the outcome of their 
negotiation with the rest of the class.  In the survey we ask about the primary mode(s) of 
communication they use to discuss this negotiation with their agent/principal.  We 
compare these to the level of trust (Johnson-George and Swap, 1982) and rapport (Jap, 
Robertson and Hamilton, 2011) which they report about their agent/principal. 
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When people trust each other they are more likely to be open about things they 
are concerned with (Johnson-George and Swap, 1982).  In addition to asking about this in 
the trust questionnaire, we also directly tested openness in the communication itself.  
Before the negotiation begins the sellers, buyers, and buyers’ agents are told that the 
house has asbestos that needs to be removed.  The sellers’ agents are not given this 
information.  We compared which sellers are open about this defect with their principals.   
In addition, we took advantage of the fact that this negotiation exercise includes a 
wide range of possibilities for agreement which included benefits for all four parties.  
Those who did not reach a deal missed out on an opportunity for surplus.  We compared 
this outcome – whether the students reached a deal – for students who communicated 
using different media.   
 
Results 
The students surveyed were born between 1988 and 1993; they are all 
Millennials.  Of the 120 students who responded to the survey, 10 primarily used written 
digital communication (text messages and emails,) 91 primarily spoke in person, and 17 
talked over the phone.  There were no significant differences in reported trust or rapport 
between the groups. Two students primarily used Skype; they reported lower trust and 
rapport, but we cannot draw significant conclusions based on these two responses. 
 
Table C1. Trust and rapport by primary communication type 
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Openness.  All of the sellers who communicated digitally and over the phone 
discussed asbestos with their principals at some point.  In contrast, four (10%) of the 
sellers and sellers’ agents who primarily communicated in-person did not discuss 
asbestos with their agents/principals at any point during the exercise.  The sellers who 
communicated digitally with their agents not only were more open about the asbestos, but 
also tended to open up about this issue early on in the negotiation; all of the sellers and 
sellers agents who communicated digitally reported discussing asbestos early in the 
exercise, whereas 60% (6/10) of those who communicated via phone and 70% (28/40) of 
those who communicated in person reported discussing it early on. 
 
Outcome.  None of the students who primarily communicated via written digital 
communication reported that they did not reach a deal.  In contrast, ten students (11%) 
who primarily communicated in person reported that they did not reach a deal. 
 
Discussion 
 In study 1 we randomly assigned participants to a type of communication; in 
study 2 we analyzed the behavior of participants who were required to use both digital 
and in-person communication.  In this study the participants chose which communication 
type to use.  If we assume that students only used communication with which they were 
comfortable, we can use this study to isolate the effects of different types of 
communication without the effects of comfort with those media.  What we find is that 
there is no significant effect of type of media on trust or rapport in this setting.  
Furthermore, people who communicated digitally were more likely to be open in their 
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conversations with their agents and were more likely to reach a deal.  This study supports 
our previous findings that in contrast to prior research, communicating digitally does not 
detract from trust and rapport, but rather encourages openness and working together. 
  
83 
Study 4 
 
 In studies 1-3 we saw that Millennials communicating digitally can and do build 
trust.  These studies treat all digital communication in the same category.  Not all face-to-
face conversations are the same; the language people use, the length of time people talk, 
the content of the discussion, and the tone of voice all impact to what extent 
communication encourages trust.  Similarly, we expect that not all digital communication 
is the same.  In study 4 we look at what styles of digital communication are most 
effective in building the trust we saw possible in studies 1-3. 
 
Method 
Mechanical Turk online survey participants were recruited to read an article and 
play an online game in exchange for a small reward.  Participants read an article about a 
physician whose patient tells him he committed a crime.  The participants were then 
paired with each other and chatted online with their partners for five minutes.  They were 
asked to chat about the article, which 81% did.   
Participants then played a trust game, similar to the game played in study 1, 
modeled after the investment game designed by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995).  
(The sender receives $3, chooses to give some of this to the receiver who receives triple 
whatever was sent and then chooses to send some of it back.)  We measured trust using a 
continuous variable of how much money the participants send.  We also asked the same 
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set of survey questions as in study 1, measuring trust, rapport and positive affect.  (See 
Appendices A-C.) 
A research assistant coded the texts of the chats for whether they had a 
conversation, whether that conversation included a discussion of the article, whether the 
conversation included strong feelings about the issue one way or another, whether the 
participants discussed their emotions, and whether the participants used “texting words” 
(such as “ttyl” or “thx”) or emoticons. 
We analyzed results from the 254 participants who were raised in the United 
States.  Some of the participants (101/404 total, 50/254 US-raised) did not have 
conversations at all, as they preferred to spend the five minutes doing something else.  
These participants were excluded from our results.  We analyzed the results from 204 
participants who had conversations and were raised in the United States, of which 200 
played the trust game.  (Two pairs did not answer the test questions about the trust game 
correctly and did not play.)  For the purpose of these analyses, we classified Millennials 
as people who were between the ages of 18 and 31 during the time of the study 
(November, 2013) putting their birth years between 1982 and 2005 (part of the Millennial 
Generation, according to Howe and Strauss, 2007). 
 
Results 
  Summary.  The 100 participants in the “sending” position in the game sent on 
average $1.92 (out of a possible $3).  Twelve participants sent nothing and 36 sent the 
full $3.  The participants in the “return” position returned $1.52 on average.  The 
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maximum returned was $6 and 24 participants who received more than zero returned 
zero. 
 Participants in the sending position expected to receive 36.73% of the money 
received by their partner (equivalent to a 10.2% return on the “investment”).  Thirteen of 
these participants thought they would not receive any money back from their partner. 
 
 Texting Style.  The participants whose conversations included texting words and 
emoticons sent slightly more money in the trust game, but had slightly lower values on 
the rapport, trust, and positive affect surveys.  These scores were not significantly 
affected by whether the participants were Millennials.  Because these differences are not 
statistically significant, and the surveys do not support the same hypothesis as the 
outcome of the game, we conclude that using “texting words” and emoticons did not 
affect trust-building in this study. 
 
Discussion content.  Not surprisingly, the more people chatted, (measured by the 
number of words exchanged,) the more they developed trust (p < 0.05) and rapport (p < 
0.001) and the more positive affect they felt about their counterparts (p < 0.001).  As 
expected, longer conversations meant more time getting to know each other, developing 
stronger relationships.  Another possibility is that people who liked each other more were 
also more likely to talk for longer periods of time.  This would mean that the positive 
affect between the chatters effected greater trust and encouraged participants to exchange 
more chats. 
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What was interesting in this study was the content of that discussion.  Particularly, 
our research assistant coded whether the participants discussed the article.  Most 
participants who did not discuss the article texted “small talk” (e.g. asking where they are 
from, how often they do Mechanical Turk surveys, etc.) whereas participants who 
discussed the article were more likely to have meaningful conversations, exchanging 
ideas about patients’ rights and doctors’ responsibilities.  The twelve participants in the 
sending position who didn’t discuss the article sent significantly less money in the trust 
game than the 88 who did discuss the article (p < 0.05).  Additionally, the participants in 
both positions who discussed the article reported significantly more trust, rapport, and 
positive affect than those who did not.  This indicates that people who have more 
meaningful conversations were more likely to build trusting relationships through those 
conversations. 
 
Table D1.  Mechanical Turk Trust Game: Effect of discussing article on money sent and 
trust survey responses 
 
Table D2.  Mechanical Turk Trust Game: Effect of discussing article on rapport and 
positive affect survey responses 
 
Table D3.  Correlation of money sent in trust game with trust, rapport, and positive 
affect survey responses 
 
Millennials.  When both participants in a pair were Millennials (aged 18-31) the 
sender sent more money (p < 0.05).  However other than that effect, we did not find that 
whether participants were Millennials significantly affected trust and relationship 
development in this forum.  This may be due to a selection bias with this sample.  
87 
Mechanical Turk is an online survey platform in which participants choose to do online 
activities in exchange for a small reward.  The people who sign up for and use 
Mechanical Turk often spend many hours a day answering online surveys, and therefore 
people of all ages who use this platform will be comfortable with the online setting and 
accustomed to communicating in this way. In this sense, the non-Millennials become like 
Millennials in terms of their frequent use of online communication. 
To verify this hypothesis we asked participants at different points in the survey to 
rate their use of different forms of communication by answering the following questions: 
In general, I feel most comfortable using… 
In general, I talk to my friends using… 
Participants then had a list of communication media (Phone, Texting, E-mail, Gchat, 
Blackberry Messenger, Facebook, In person, Skype/Video chat) which they rated 1 to 8. 
We looked at people who answered “1” (feel the most comfortable/use the most 
when talking to friends) to digital media (Texting, E-mail, Gchat, Blackberry Messenger, 
Facebook).  For the first question, 68/125 Millennials and 34/79 non-Millennials reported 
they were most comfortable using digital media (p = 0.12).  On the second question, 
68/125 Millennials and 38/79 non-Millennials reported talking to their friends most often 
through digital media (p = 0.38).It seems that with the tested group, Millennials and non-
Millennials have similar levels of comfort and experience with digital communication.  
This could explain why we did not see significant differences between the two groups in 
their ability to build trust and rapport online (Hypothesis 5). 
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Discussion 
 We saw in studies 1, 2, and 3 that people can use digital communication to build 
trust.  Study 4 explores the next aspect of this research – what about digital 
communication builds trust?  Instead of focusing on who is communicating (or how old 
they are) this study analyzes the content of digital communication.  In particular, we 
found that digital communication builds trust much the same way that non-digital 
communication builds trust.  The more people communicate, the more positively they 
think about each other, the more trust they build and the greater rapport they develop with 
one another.  Additionally, people who had a discussion beyond small talk (in our case, 
people who discussed the ethical, legal and emotional aspects of the article,) were more 
likely to develop positive relationships – with increased trust, rapport and positive affect. 
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Study 5 
 
 In study 5 we take the results from the previous studies – that people build trust 
via digital communication – and try to understand whether this trust changes over time as 
people get more comfortable with a particular digital medium.  In this study we challenge 
the assumption that Millennials are more likely to trust when communicating digitally 
because they are comfortable with digital communication, and we ask whether people of 
all ages can learn to use digital communication in a way that will help them trust.  For 
this study we hypothesize that digital trust can be learned over time through repeated 
digital interactions with positive feedback. 
 
Method 
For this study we used “Glide,” a smartphone application which allows people to 
both text each other and to send short video clips. The dependent variable was the same 
trust game from Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) as in Studies 1 and 4. (Sender 
receives $3, chooses to give some of this to Receiver who receives triple whatever the 
Sender sent and then chooses to send some of it back.)
11
 
                                                             
 
11 There are differences between this game in study 5 and the games in studies 1 and 4: 
 In study 5 the game is repeated multiple times. 
 In studies 1 and 4 the participants first read an article which they were instructed to 
discuss.  Participants received instructions about the game only after the discussion 
with their teammates.  In study 5 participants received instructions about the game 
first, and then communicated with their teammates, so the natural topic of 
communication was the game itself. 
 In study 5, the Receiver role was played by a confederate. 
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We recruited participants from Mechanical Turk who have an iPod, iPhone, or 
Android phone with a 3G, LTE, or Wi-Fi internet connection.  (Five people who started 
the game left because they did not have a supported platform.) 
We asked participants to download the Glide application.  Participants received 
instructions for how to play the trust game and answered questions to ensure they 
understood.  Then we asked participants to use a specific form of communication (either 
texting or video messaging) and paired them with a partner through Glide.  We confirmed 
that the participants were using the type of communication we assigned.  Then each 
participant communicated with a partner for three minutes, after which they played the 
trust game with that partner.  They then communicated with a different partner and 
played another trust game, a total of four times. 
Participants were randomly assigned to communicate via: 
text messages for all four rounds 
video messages for all four rounds 
text messages for rounds 1-3, video messages for round 4 
video messages for rounds 1-3, text messages for round 4 
Participants were not told how they would communicate in future rounds.  
Because we are primarily interested in the trusting aspect of the trust game – how 
much the first person sends – the receiver/replier was played by a confederate.  This also 
allowed us to control for the content of the conversations and the feedback that 
participants received after each round about how much money was returned.  The 
confederates were instructed to have a picture of themselves on the application so that 
even people who chatted via text knew what their partners look like. 
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After each round of chatting and sending money in the game, participants were 
asked brief questions about trust and rapport they felt for the other person.  They were 
then told how much the other person sent back to them.  These numbers were 
predetermined rounded multiples of the amounts they sent.
12
 
We informed participants in the beginning that they will play the game multiple 
times (each time receiving a new $3 to play with) and will be paid based on the results of 
one of these games, chosen at random.  This controlled for the wealth effect. 
 
Results 
 Ninety-one people started the survey.  Five were ineligible for technological 
reasons (they didn’t have the supported platform to run Glide); 4 had other technological 
problems; 17 answered the game comprehension questions incorrectly; 2 answered 
questions in a way which made it clear they were not paying attention to the study.  63 
participants participated in the full study, 30 male, aged 19-67, with average age 30.5. 
 
Text vs. Video.  Confirming results from previous studies, participants who text 
chatted with each other had as much trust as those who sent video messages back and 
forth.  In the first round of chats and trust games both text chatters and video chatters sent 
                                                             
 
12 Automated trust game responses based on $ value sent by senders: 
Round 1: ||1.2 * amount sent|| 
Round 2: ||1.8 * amount sent|| 
Round 3: ||1.5 * amount sent|| 
Round 4: ||0.8 * amount sent|| 
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$2.00 on average (standard deviations 0.95 for text, 1.15 for video).  For the first 3 
rounds the text chatters sent $2.18 on average (standard deviation 0.90) and the video 
chatters comparably sent $2.16 (standard deviation 1.12). 
 In this analysis Millennial status did not play a significant role in trust using 
different communication media.  As in study 4, we expect that this is because people who 
use Mechanical Turk and have the technological platform for running the Glide 
application (a smartphone or tablet) are adept and comfortable with text chatting.  To 
confirm this hypothesis, we asked these participants how they generally talk with their 
friends.  Only 18 responded that their primary communication with their friends is in-
person, and 10 responded that talking on the phone is primary.  In contrast, 35 
participants (56%) responded that they primarily communicate digitally, either through 
text messages (24) video chats (2) email (1) or other online chats (8).  Whether people 
primarily communicated digitally was not correlated with their age (correlation -0.21) or 
millennial status (correlation 0.23). 
 
Learning to Trust.  People communicating via text message or video message 
learn to trust more over time through repeated interactions with positive feedback.  In 
rounds 1-3 participants who sent money in the game were returned more than the money 
that they sent.  Through this process participants learned that they could trust the people 
they were communicating with through Glide, and over time they learned to trust more 
and send more money with the expectation of greater return (Hypothesis 4). 
 We see this progress when we compare rounds 1 and 3, as in Table E1.  Both 
texting chatters and video chatters send significantly more money in round 3 (after two 
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rounds of learning to trust) than they do in round 1.  Regression analysis shows the 
significance of the round number in predicting how much money is sent (p < 0.05), 
especially for text messages.  We also looked at the difference in differences comparing 
text and video chatters between rounds 1 and 3 and found no significant differences 
between the two conditions, suggesting that people learn to trust with both types of 
media. 
 
Table E1. Change in money sent in rounds 1-3 for all participants 
 
Learning from communication media.  The analysis thus far only looks at the 
first 3 rounds of the game, showing that in these rounds people learned to trust.  It does 
not say whether that learning came from playing the game multiple times or from 
multiple positive interactions with communication media.  To understand this distinction 
we analyzed results from the fourth round of the game, comparing them to the results 
from the first 3 rounds.  In the fourth round, 29 participants used different media than 
they did in the first 3 rounds (18 switched from text to video, and 11 did the opposite). 
 The regression results from the money sent in rounds 1-3 show a coefficient of 
0.20 (standard error .09) for the round number.  If we assume a linear model, participants 
would have sent approximately $2.61 in the fourth round.  We ran an event study to 
predict a non-linear model which predicted $2.22 sent in the fourth round.  The 
participants who changed media in the fourth round were in line with this prediction, 
sending $2.22 on average, but those who stayed with the same media sent more in the 
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game: $2.46.  Neither the event study nor an ANOVA repeated measures analysis 
showed these differences to be significant. 
Even if those analyses are not significant, we can still understand whether 
learning that occurs in the study is because of the game or because of the media.  If our 
hypothesis is correct and people learn from the media and not only from the game then 
we would expect that when people play the same game with new media, they will act 
similarly as they did when they started playing the game.  In other words, for those who 
switch media in round 4, the amount they send in round 4 will be similar to the amount 
they sent in round 1.  In contrast, those who stayed with the media they learned to trust 
will send more in round 4 than they did in the previous rounds. 
We found support for this hypothesis in our analysis.  Participants who switched 
media sent an amount in the round 4 game not significantly different from the amount 
they gave in round 1 (p = 0.28).  Participants who stayed with the same media sent 
significantly higher amounts in round 4 than in round 1 (p < 0.01).  (See Table E2 and 
Graph E3.)  Additionally, when looking at regressions for all four rounds of the game, the 
round number is only significant for those who stayed with the same media (coefficient 
0.18, standard error 0.07, p < 0.05) and not for those who changed media (coefficient 
0.07, standard error 0.08, p = 0.37).  (Neither texting/video nor millennial/non-millennial 
were significant factors in these analyses.) 
 What this analysis suggests is that the increase in trust that we see throughout the 
game (for participants who stay with the same media) and through rounds 1-3 (for 
participants who change media in round 4,) is not explained by game learning but rather 
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by media learning.  Through repeated digital interactions, participants learned to trust 
people they interacted with via text and video messaging (Hypothesis 4). 
 
Table E2. Change in money sent in round 4 for participants with the same and different 
media in the fourth round 
 
Figure 2.  Money sent in rounds 1-4 for participants with the same and different media 
in the fourth round 
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Discussion 
 
Through studies 1, 2, and 3 we showed that Millennials are able to use digital 
communication just as well as they are able to use in-person communication; through 
digital communication, Millennials can build trusting and cooperative relationships, 
involving openness and working together. 
In studies 4 and 5 we examined two particular aspects of digital communication to 
get a better sense of how and why this communication works.  We looked at what types 
of texting create stronger relationships, showing that longer texting conversations that 
went beyond small talk generated greater trust and rapport.  We also showed that the 
ability to use digital communication to generate trust and cooperation does not have to be 
defined by a person’s age; even non-Millennials can learn to use these forms of 
communication and over time learn to build trusting relationships through digital media. 
Prior research on communication in negotiations suggests that face-to-face 
communication will elicit more trust and cooperation than digital media (Bazerman, 
Curhan, Moore & Valley, 2000; Thompson & Nadler, 2002; Valley et al. 1998).  
Although the results from the studies in this paper diverge from this research, they do not 
necessarily conflict with the theories developed in that research.  Rather we suggest that 
assumptions about how people act in negotiations change as the people and society being 
studied change.  The change discussed in this paper is the generational effect of digital 
communication for the Millennial Generation (Godwin-Jones, 2005) and for the digitally-
comfortable non-Millennials.  The analysis in the paper recommends that people re-think 
conventional wisdom about the mode of communication they use when negotiating with 
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these groups.  Thinking differently about Millennials (and some non-Millennials,) we 
come to new conclusions about effecting trust, and show that digital communication can 
be used to generate trusting and cooperative relationships. 
Adair and colleagues (2004) discuss the importance of tailoring communication 
strategies to specific cultures.  Their research on the use of both direct and indirect 
communication advises that, “To generate joint gains or enlarge the pie, negotiators must 
share enough information to understand each other’s priorities and identify trade-offs and 
compatible issues” (Adair 2004, p. 89).  Similar research is needed on tailoring 
communication strategies for specific age groups.  This paper begins to explore this field. 
Given the importance of communication in negotiations (Balliet, 2010; Bazerman 
et al. 2000; Valley et al. 1998), these results have significant implications. The viability 
of online communication in successful negotiations is important as Millennials become 
an increasing percentage of the workplace (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013).  The 
analysis provided in this paper recommends that Millennials and those who negotiate 
with them who want to encourage cooperation and trust should consider text-message-
like discussions a viable and even preferable mode of communication under certain 
circumstances.  Additionally, this paper opens up the possibility for further research on 
specific generational effects in understanding communication and cooperation in 
negotiations. 
In this paper, particularly in studies 4 and 5, we started analyzing what types of 
texting creates greater trust.  In the next paper, “Why the F*** Don’t They TRUST?” we 
continue this process, theorizing about and testing the effects of two particular texting 
behaviors: norm-violating online incivility and norm-abiding online shouting.  These are 
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two of what we believe to be many examples of how the way people communicate 
digitally affects their ability to create trust and cooperation.  
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Tables  and Figures 
Table A1. Difference between face-to-face and digital texts in trust game outcomes 
 Money Sent Percentage of tripled 
amount expected to 
be returned 
Percentage returned 
Overall 2.16 
(1.04) 
0.45 
(0.35) 
0.37 
(0.24) 
Digital Text 1.94 
(1.17) 
0.43 
(0.20) 
0.27 
(0.21) 
Face-to-Face 2.36 
(0.88) 
0.47 
(0.42) 
0.44 
(0.24) 
Significance of 
difference between 
Face-to-face and 
Text 
 
p = 0.06 
 
p = 0.60 
 
p < 0.01 
N 87 (42 digital; 45 
face-to-face) 
75 (32 digital; 43 
face-to-face) 
73 (32 digital; 41 
face-to-face) 
 
Table A2.  Correlation of money sent in trust game with trust, rapport, and positive 
affect survey responses 
 Money sent 
in trust 
game 
Percentage 
returned in 
trust game 
Trust 
(survey) 
Rapport 
(survey) 
Positive Affect 
(survey) 
Money sent in 
trust game 
1.00     
Percentage 
returned in 
trust game 
-- 1.00    
Trust 
(survey) 
0.30 0.18 1.00   
Rapport 
(survey) 
0.35 0.29 0.65 1.00  
Positive 
Affect 
(survey) 
0.26 0.27 0.71 0.77 1.00 
N 87 73 173 173 173 
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Table B1. Undergraduate and MBA OLS Regression on Price
13
 
 Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 
Intercept 22.60*** 
(0.09) 
25.71*** 
(0.39) 
25.43*** 
(0.38) 
Messages
14
 4.76*** 
(0.33) 
3.91*** 
(0.34) 
4.10*** 
(0.32) 
Face-to-Face 1.12** 
(0.49) 
1.77*** 
(0.50) 
0.73 
(0.51) 
Round  -0.40*** 
(0.05) 
-0.26*** 
(0.05) 
Delta
15
   -4.10*** 
(0.32) 
Totals
16
   -0.68** 
(0.29) 
R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.06 
F Messages=Face-
to-Face 
44.92*** 14.42*** 34.62*** 
Number of rounds 
analyzed 
5666 5666 5666 
N (Worlds) 427 427 427 
 
                                                             
 
13
 Includes fixed effects at the world level (427 groups) and robust standard errors to 
allow for heteroskedasticity. 
14
 Messages indicates round following digital messaging. Face-to-face indicates rounds 
following face-to-face discussions. 
15
 A fourth computer-generated country (“Delta”) produces in the world, which produces 
a random but small number of barrels. 
16
 After the round, countries will only find out the worldwide production and not 
individual country production for the round. 
* p <.05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Table B2. Undergraduate and MBA Probit: Likelihood of Non-Cooperation
17
 
 Likelihood of Price 
     
Likelihood of Price 
     
Intercept -0.44*** 
(0.07) 
-0.56*** 
(0.07) 
Messages
18
 0.39*** 
(0.04) 
0.37*** 
(0.04) 
Face-to-Face -0.07 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
Round -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Delta
19
 -0.48*** 
(0.07) 
-0.55*** 
(0.09) 
Totals
20
 0.30*** 
(0.05) 
0.33*** 
(0.05) 
Final Round -0.52*** 
(0.13) 
-0.36*** 
(0.14) 
Number of rounds 
analyzed 
5666 5666 
N (Worlds) 427 427 
 
                                                             
 
17
 Includes fixed effects at the world level (427 groups) and robust standard errors to 
allow for heteroskedasticity. 
18
 Messages indicates round following digital messaging. Face-to-face indicates rounds 
following face-to-face discussions. 
19
 A fourth computer-generated country (“Delta”) produces in the world, which produces 
a random but small number of barrels. 
20
 After the round, countries will only find out the worldwide production and not 
individual country production for the round. 
* p <.05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Table B3. Undergraduate and MBA Event study showing mean abnormal price
21
 
 1
st
 Round after 
communication 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 Rounds 
after communication 
1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 
Rounds after 
communication 
Messages
22
 5.58 
(0.34) 
5.51 
(0.24) 
4.56 
(0.20) 
Face-to-Face -0.04 
(0.43) 
1.13 
(0.29) 
0.59 
(0.23) 
 
  
                                                             
 
21
 In the event study we calculated the expected price without the communication rounds 
(and without the second and third round after) and compare those expected prices with 
the actual prices in the data during those rounds.  The methodology used follows that 
outlined here http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/eventstudy.html. 
22
 Messages indicates round following digital messaging. Face-to-face indicates rounds 
following face-to-face discussions. 
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Table B4. Executive MBA OLS Regressions on Price
23
 
 Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 
Intercept 17.25*** 
(1.28) 
22.94*** 
(1.44) 
23.16*** 
(1.46) 
Messages
24
 6.23*** 
(1.09) 
4.68*** 
(1.03) 
4.31*** 
(1.12) 
Face-to-Face 7.24*** 
(1.33) 
6.43*** 
(1.31) 
6.04*** 
(1.38) 
Round  -0.55*** 
(0.12) 
-0.53*** 
(0.13) 
Delta
25
   -2.53** 
(1.06) 
Totals
26
   0.11 
(0.92) 
R-squared 0.07 0.13 0.14 
F Messages=Face-
to-Face 
0.76 2.59 2.54 
Number of rounds 
analyzed 
654 654 654 
N (Worlds) 39 39 39 
 
                                                             
 
23
 Includes fixed effects at the world level (39 groups). 
24
 Messages indicates round following digital messaging. Face-to-face indicates rounds 
following face-to-face discussions. 
25
 A fourth computer-generated country (“Delta”) produces in the world, which produces 
a random but small number of barrels. 
26
 After the round, countries will only find out the worldwide production and not 
individual country production for the round. 
* p <.05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Table B5.  Undergraduate, MBA and Executive MBA OLS Regressions on Price
27
 
 Mod 1 
Intercept 26.08*** 
(0.49) 
Executive MBA Messages
28
 5.10*** 
(1.05) 
Executive MBA Face-to-Face 6.65*** 
(1.30) 
Young Messages
29
 2.54*** 
(0.40) 
Young Face-to-Face 1.24*** 
(0.50) 
Round -0.40*** 
(0.06) 
Executive MBA -4.70*** 
(1.31) 
R-squared 0.06 
F (Executive messages = 
Young messages) 
2.03 
F (Executive face-to-face = 
Young face-to-face) 
5.19* 
Number of rounds analyzed 6320 
N (Worlds) 466 
                                                             
 
27
 Includes fixed effects at the world level (466 groups). 
28
 Messages indicates round following digital messaging. Face-to-face indicates rounds 
following face-to-face discussions. 
29
 “Young” refers to undergraduates and MBA (not Executive MBA). 
* p <.05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Table C1.  House Sale: Trust and rapport survey responses by primary communication 
media
30
 
 All Digital Phone Face-to-Face Skype 
Trust 5.47 
(1.00) 
 
5.45 
(1.23) 
 
5.70 
(0.95) 
 
5.46 
(0.97) 
 
3.95 
(1.18) 
 
Rapport 5.50 
(1.12) 
 
5.28 
(1.24) 
 
5.84 
(1.03) 
 
5.50 
(1.08) 
 
3.51 
(1.94) 
 
N 120 10 17 91 2 
 
Table D1.  Effect of discussing article on money sent and trust survey responses
31
 
 Mod 1: 
Money Sent in 
Game 
Mod 2: 
Money Sent in 
Game 
Mod 3: 
Trust Survey 
Mod 4: 
Trust 
Survey 
Intercept 1.57*** 
(0.33) 
1.36*** 
(0.31) 
36.71*** 
(1.69) 
37.08** 
(1.60) 
Discuss Article 0.66* 
(0.31) 
0.68* 
(0.30) 
5.00** 
(1.52) 
5.10** 
(1.53) 
Millennial 
Participant 
-0.13 
(0.21) 
 1.53 
(1.06) 
 
Both Participants 
Millennials 
 0.43* 
(0.21) 
 1.45 
(1.09) 
Male -0.31 
(0.20) 
-0.41* 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(1.04) 
-0.10 
(1.05) 
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 
N 100 100 204 204 
                                                             
 
30 Trust and rapport scores had 0.85 correlation. 
31  * p <.05 
    ** p < .01 
    *** p < .001 
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Table D2.  Effect of discussing article on rapport and positive affect survey responses
32
 
 Mod 1: 
Rapport 
Mod 2: 
Rapport 
Mod 3: 
Positive Affect 
Mod 4: 
Positive Affect 
Intercept 28.31*** 
(1.77) 
28.22*** 
(1.68) 
38.49*** 
(1.82) 
38.68*** 
(1.73) 
Discuss Article 3.87* 
(1.60) 
3.92* 
(1.61) 
6.18*** 
(1.65) 
6.15*** 
(1.66) 
Millennial 
Participant 
0.12 
(1.12) 
 0.28 
(1.15) 
 
Both 
Participants 
Millennials 
 0.39 
(1.15) 
 -0.01 
(1. 18) 
Male -1.51 
(1.09) 
-1.56 
(1.10) 
-0.71 
(1.12) 
-0.68 
(1.13) 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 
N 204 204 204 204 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
  0.97 0.97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
32 * p <.05 
    ** p < .01 
    *** p < .001 
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Table D3.  Correlation of money sent in trust game with trust, rapport, and positive 
affect survey responses 
 Money sent 
in trust 
game 
Trust 
(survey) 
Rapport 
(survey) 
Positive 
Affect 
(survey) 
Money sent in trust 
game 
1.00    
Trust (survey) 0.26 1.00   
Rapport (survey) 0.24 0.64 1.00  
Positive Affect 
(survey) 
0.15 0.67 0.74 1.00 
N 100 204 204 204 
 
 
Table E1. Change in money sent in rounds 1-3 for all participants
33
 
 Round 1 
$ sent 
Round 2 
$ sent 
Round 3 
$ sent 
Difference 
between 
round 3 and 
round 1 
N 
Overall 2.00 
(1.02) 
2.15 
(0.99) 
2.41 
(0.86) 
0.41*** 
(0.78) 
63 
Text 2.00 
(0.95) 
2.03 
(0.97) 
2.41 
(0.77) 
0.41*** 
(0.73) 
38 
Video 2.00 
(1.15) 
2.34 
(1.01) 
2.40 
(1.00) 
0.40* 
(0.85) 
25 
 
 
                                                             
 
33 * p <.05 
    ** p < .01 
    *** p < .001 
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Table E2. Change in money sent in round 4 for participants with the same and 
different media in the fourth round
28
 
 Round 1 
$ sent 
Round 2 
$ sent 
Round 3 
$ sent 
Round 4 
$ sent 
Difference 
between 
round 4 and 
round 1 
N 
Overall 2.00 
(1.02) 
2.15 
(0.99) 
2.41 
(0.86) 
2.35 
(0.94) 
0.35** 
(0.93) 
63 
Same 4
th
 
round 
1.96 
(0.97) 
2.19 
(0.97) 
2.47 
(0.86) 
2.46 
(0.90) 
0.51** 
(0.99) 
34 
Different 
4
th
 round 
2.05 
(1.10) 
2.10 
(1.03) 
2.34 
(0.87) 
2.22 
(0.99) 
0.17 
(0.85) 
29 
 
Figure 2.  Money sent in rounds 1-4 for participants with the same and different media 
in the fourth round 
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WHY THE F*** DON’T THEY TRUST? 
The Relationship between Online Incivility, Shouting, and Trust 
 
 “What is one of the most common complaints people have today about 
social media sites, forums, message boards, comment threads, etc? Can you 
guess? Yes, that’s right – flaming, rudeness, foul language, disrespect, lack 
of civility. Whether it’s simple vulgarity or a collection of hate filled speech, 
people see this and get turned off. It discourages people from taking part in 
communities and conversations.” -Alex Grossman, blogger, 2011 
 
Grossman’s social commentary emphasizes an issue that people who conduct 
business online frequently experience – online incivility discourages people from 
cooperative participation and engaging in online communication (Pogue, 2006; 
Shandwick and Tate, 2012).  People communicating and conducting business online need 
particularly high levels of trust (Herring, 2002) which they form through their digital 
interactions.  We focus on two aspects of digital interactions – norm-violating online 
incivility and norm-abiding online shouting – to illustrate how the way people 
communicate affects their ability to build trust and cooperation.  We use these examples 
to illustrate how moral norms such as civility (Kim and Strudler, 2012) can be used to 
advance a cooperative online world.  We analyze what types of behaviors are considered 
uncivil in a digital context, particularly in online chats.  Then we show that by 
encouraging people to abide by civility norms we can develop a more trusting online 
environment. 
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Incivility 
 
People working online are interested in developing and maintaining trust 
(Mathwick, 2002).  Companies need trusting relationships with suppliers, distributors, 
customers, and complementary businesses (Ozer, 2005).  People on all sides of online 
dealings need to trust that the other parties are truthful and sincere in order to engage in 
safe, meaningful interactions (Herring, 2002).  Similar to an offline relationship, for each 
side to show that she is likely to pull her weight, she needs a signal.  The difference in 
online relationships is that what one person types to another is often the only information 
the other has about her.  Therefore, in order for online parties to develop strong 
relationships and to show that they are trustworthy, they must give a digital signal 
indicating that they agree with certain principles and values, thereby implying that they 
are likely to follow the social norms of the group.  One way to digitally signal this 
agreement is through civility. 
Incivility is a display of “rudeness and disregard for others in a manner that 
violates norms for respect” (Pearson and Porath, 2005).  Characteristics of uncivil 
behavior include rudeness, disregarding others, showing disrespect, being condescending 
or degrading, and doubting others’ judgment (Cortina, Magley, Williams and Langhout, 
2001, Pearson and Porath, 2005, Phillips and Smith, 2004). 
Over the last two decades, researchers wrote extensively about workplace 
incivility.  Andersson and Pearson (1999) defined this as “low-intensity deviant behavior 
with ambiguous intent to harm the target, in violation of workplace norms for mutual 
respect.”  Lim and Cortina (2005) clarified that workplace incivility is similar to 
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psychological aggression, but involves behaviors which lack clear intentionality.  When 
discussing online incivility we rewrite this definition as “low-intensity deviant behavior 
in violation of online norms for mutual respect.” 
The norms we discuss are similar to Coleman’s (1990) social norms, which 
“specify what actions are regarded by a set of persons as proper or correct, or improper or 
incorrect” (Coleman, 1990:242).  In particular, we discuss the types of norms described 
by Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) as community-specific norms.  These are norms that 
are consistent with the behavior and beliefs of most individuals in the group and reflect 
chosen values and preferences.  In this context, online norms for mutual respect are 
online behaviors that are consistent with the mutual respect upheld by, and believed to be 
important by, most individuals in the online community.  This definition excludes from 
“incivility” behaviors which do not violate online norms, such as online shouting.  (This 
will be discussed further below.) 
As with other areas of business ethics, there are two approaches to studying 
incivility:  Normative methods describe how things should be, (e.g. people should not 
lie,) while empirical methods describe how things are (e.g. most people lie once a day).  
The comprehensive study of business ethics requires utilization of both empirical and 
normative perspectives (Robertson, 1993; Donaldson, 1994).  In this paper we combine 
these two methods with a “symbiotic” approach, where the theoretical cores of normat ive 
ethics and behavioral research remain separate, but in which the normative goals guide 
the focus of the empirical studies (Weaver and Trevino, 1994). 
The purpose of this approach is to use normative imperatives to direct empirical 
discussion (Robertson, 1993).  In order to understand why uncivil behavior is unethical, 
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we explain what effects this behavior has.  While causal accounts cannot replace moral 
justification, we can expect to “learn from experiments in living” (Appiah, 2008).  In 
particular, we use the empirical findings of the effects of incivility to help describe why 
they are normatively wrong; incivility is wrong (in part) because it leads to negative 
social consequences, particularly to lower levels of trust and cooperation. 
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Moral Wrong of Incivility 
 
Recently researchers developed moral arguments against incivility from various 
normative perspectives (Kim and Strudler, 2012; Stohr, 2012) which we can apply to a 
digital context.  The arguments commonly maintain that civility is a serious ethical 
endeavor and no less a moral imperative than any other lofty moral enterprise in business. 
In this section our intention is to show that online incivility is ethically wrong, rather than 
to judge among these perspectives. 
Kantian ethics may address the wrong of incivility.  One’s uncivil attitude does 
not adequately respect others, and ‘respect’ is a core idea in Kantian moral theory (Wood, 
1999; Hill, 2000).  Kant himself acknowledges the importance of civility (Frierson, 2005).  
For the Kantian one’s actions should reflect respect for reasonable choice through an 
exchange of reasons or co-deliberation, a process of reasoning together with a person to 
identify mutually acceptable ends (Korsgaard, 1996; 2009).  It is wrong to exclude a 
person from reasoning about some matter that involves her.  This wrong of exclusion, of 
failing to engage in an exchange of reasons, may explain the wrong in incivility. 
One might suggest that agent-centered virtue ethics can provide us with more 
holistic views about the disvalue of incivility.  Civility is not clearly included in 
Aristotle’s list of the virtues, although there is a brief reference to it in Book IV, Chapter 
VI of Nicomachean Ethics, in the context of his discussion of friendliness in intimate 
relationships.  However, one might suggest that Aristotle’s “civic (or political) friendship” 
may be a fit virtue for discussing the value of civility (Kekes, 1989).  Civic friendship is 
an attitude based on the recognition that by wishing and doing well towards other 
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members of society, the fabric of society is enhanced and maintained (Cooper, 1977, 
Schwarzenbach, 2009).  
The virtue of civic friendship requires one to treat other members of society in 
publicly expected ways, in accordance with public norms.  Hence an agent who exercises 
the virtue of civic friendship would not characteristically act in violation of such public 
norms.  The uncivil person does not act in accordance with the required norm.  Therefore 
the virtue ethicist may maintain that he acted wrongfully. 
Additionally, we need to emphasize Asians’ insightful attitude to the value of 
civility  (Adams, 1995, Kim and Strudler, 2012).  Kim and Strudler (2012) showed that 
the practice of workplace civility is morally essential to the decent workplace.  According 
to Herbert Fingarette’s interpretation of Confucian ethics, part of respecting a person is to 
value her as sacred.  Sacredness emerges from participation in rituals which form the 
normative basis for well-mannered behavior and its expressed quality (Fingarette, 1972, 
1983, and 2008).  Rituals by their nature are conventional, in much the same way that 
language is conventional; both ritual and language derive their significance from a shared 
understanding and purpose of people who use them.  Confucius maintains that excellent 
human relations are constituted by proper rituals, and humans become excellent by the 
sacred that emerges from their participation in proper rituals.  One who gratuitously 
ignores proper rituals fails to act consistently with the important moral value of the sacred.  
Therefore, the distinctive wrong in incivility, from a Confucian perspective, is profanity, 
mistreating someone to whom sacred treatment is due (Kim and Strudler, 2012).  Hence 
from the Confucian perspective, incivility is a ‘moral horror’ (Adams, 1995). 
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These Kantian, virtue ethics, and Confucian arguments can be applied to online 
incivility.  Much like workplace incivility, online incivility excludes others, violates civic 
friendship duties, and disregards important rituals.  While these arguments apply in an 
online context, the social contract approach allows us to take a specifically digital view of 
incivility. 
 
Social Contract Theory 
 The moral requirement to act civilly online may derive from a hypothetical social 
contract, such as the Integrative Social Contract Theory (ISCT) described by Donaldson 
and Dunfee (1994, 1999).  Like other social contracts, ISCT derives its authority from the 
assumption that people acting rationally would hypothetically consent to the terms of the 
contract affecting the community of which they are a member. 
In developing a social contract which could be accepted by global business 
people, Donaldson and Dunfee divide the obligations which stem from social contracts 
into two categories: hypernorms, such as human rights, are supported by the international 
community  and are consistent with precepts of major philosophies and with universal 
human values.  Community-specific norms are consistent with the behavior and beliefs of 
most individuals in any specific group and reflect chosen values and preferences.  In 
Donaldson and Dunfee’s framework, hypernorms create moral obligations for everyone, 
while community-specific norms only create obligations for the communities which adapt 
them. 
Previously (in section 1 of this dissertation) we applied Donaldson and Dunfee’s 
(1994; 1999) social contract theory to people who conduct business online, showing that 
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people form online communities.  In that paper we showed that norms related to trust-
building and cooperation fall into the category of morally obligatory norms.  The 
question that remains is which online behaviors are norms that build trust and 
cooperation.  These behaviors become candidates for community-specific norms for 
online communities, containing moral obligations for online users. 
 Since we are particularly discussing online incivility, we do not need to show that 
incivility violates a hypernorm; it is sufficient to show that incivility violates a 
community-specific norm for the online community.  To this end, we can discuss online 
communities and the norms they develop.  We cannot necessarily lump the entire world 
of Internet users into one category when it comes to all social or moral norms.  However 
there are certain norms which arose over the last two decades of Internet use, and which 
developed into community-specific norms among English-typing users of frequented 
websites and social media.  In this paper we will show that there are community-specific 
online norms related to incivility which although not all Internet users abide by them, are 
consistent with the belief and behavior of most individuals in the group, and are thus 
binding as community-specific norms. 
 
Practical Costs 
Contemporary business leaders may be more concerned with the outcomes of 
their employees’ behavior as a result of online incivility than with the deontological 
issues mentioned above.  The study of workplace incivility relies largely on the work of 
Andersson and Pearson (1999) who define workplace incivility as “low-intensity deviant 
behavior with ambiguous intent to harm the target, in violation of workplace norms for mutual 
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respect” and suggest that it can create significant costs.  They found that workplace 
incivility can instigate a series of negative events across an organization, which can lead 
to coercive and violent behavior.  Workplace incivility is associated with negative affect, 
and triggers negatively-associated bodily reactions such as changes in heart rate, blood 
flow, and gastrointestinal activity (Porath and Erez, 2009).  Researchers show how 
merely witnessing rudeness decreases citizenship behaviors, reduces performance (Porath 
and Erez, 2009) and inspires anger and fear in onlookers (Phillips and Smith, 2004). 
Another study reports that workers experiencing incivility have significantly 
lower supervisor satisfaction, co-worker satisfaction, work satisfaction, mental health, 
and physical health (Lim, Cortina, and Magley, 2008). Incivility significantly reduces 
workers’ helpfulness, objective cognitive functioning, creativity, and flexibility (Porath 
and Erez, 2009).  Most empirical research done in this area uses field studies to 
understand workplace incivility.  These studies show workplace incivility as an instigator 
for psychological distress, job dissatisfaction, job withdrawal, and counterproductive 
work behavior (Cortina et al., 2001, Lim and Cortina, 2005, Penney and Spector, 2005).  
Workplace incivility also depletes organizational resources and causes people (whether 
targets of incivility or witnesses to it) to have a decreased sense of organizational values 
(Pearson and Porath, 2005).  Overall, researchers find that workplace incivility can cause 
significant damage to relationships and productivity.  In this paper we explore whether 
online incivility has similar effects.  In particular, we discuss the interpersonal effects of 
incivility: how one person’s incivility affects another’s behavior (Morris & Keltner, 
2000). 
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Theory Development 
Online Incivility 
While there is significant research on the effects of workplace incivility, there is 
little empirical work looking at incivility outside of the traditional workplace (Caza and 
Cortina, 2007).  As the modern workplace moves online, the concept of workplace 
incivility will become intertwined with online incivility.  Shandwick and Tate’s 2013 
survey shows that 48% of Americans defriended, hid or blocked someone online
34
 
because their comments or behaviors were uncivil.  We should expect that while 
employees, managers, customers and dealers increasingly engage in online conversations, 
the effects of incivility in these discussions will become particularly important.  Pearson 
and Porath (2005) write, “Some organizational scientists consider the prevalence and 
costs of workplace deviance among the most serious dilemmas facing organizations 
today.”  Companies and groups which utilize web-based interactions should be equally 
concerned with online incivility as a threat to the well-being of their organizations. 
Online social environments differ from offline communities (Ozer, 2005) and 
therefore tend to have different social patterns.  Back in the days of modems and dial-up, 
Herring (1996) published a collection of papers about text-based computer-mediated 
communication, which discusses the “language, culture and social interaction” which 
distinguishes this form of communication from traditional speech.  Since then a culture of 
                                                             
 
34
 Defriending someone on social media is to remove her from a list of friends. Blocking 
someone is a way to prevent someone from accessing the blocker’s posts, and hiding 
prevents someone else’s posts from appearing on the hider’s social media. 
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online interaction has developed, taking these computer-based features and creating a 
new online society. 
Alavi, Ahuja and Medury (2011) discuss some of the unique features of online 
communities, describing how people discover that they are similar to each other (by 
describing their similar problems, requirements, opinions or experiences,) which 
encourage more empathy and trust than in offline communities where these similarities 
may take longer to become obvious.  For example, on the social news site Reddit, in a 
group about food, people can quickly learn that many people enjoy baking cupcakes, but 
have trouble making lemon meringue pies.  If the reader shares those feelings, he may 
easily feel close to the other people who posted.  In face-to-face conversations, it can take 
significantly longer to uncover similarities between people, and therefore it may take 
longer for people to develop those types of communal bonds. 
Hemetsberger (2001) analyzed another unique aspect of online behavior, showing 
that the reasons people contribute to online communities are different from the reasons 
people contribute offline.  She found that online communities reward cooperation 
differently – with stronger reputation feedback from peers – which encourages greater 
online communal contributions. 
Because of significant differences between online and face-to-face norms, 
behavioral researchers cannot simply take social theories regarding offline interactions 
and apply them to online interactions.  Kollock (1996) discusses whether we can apply 
Axelrod’s (1984) and Ostrom’s (1989) behavioral decision making research to online 
interactions and communities.  He concludes that it cannot be cut and paste in a simple 
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manner.  There are different features, constraints and challenges to deal with when 
applying these theories to online interactions. 
The challenge we approach in this paper is how to take the findings of workplace 
incivility and apply them in the social context of online incivility.  Above we defined 
online incivility as “low-intensity deviant behavior in violation of online norms for 
mutual respect.”  So what are these online norms for mutual respect?  Online 
communities develop their own norms and structures, which don’t just imitate offline life 
(Smith and Kollock, 1999).  We need to understand what these norms are to understand 
when they are violated. 
 
Online Norms 
The purpose of online norms is fundamentally similar to offline norms (Yee, 
Bailenson, Urbanek, Chang & Merget, 2007) as both define “conventional social 
behavior” (Lefkowitz, 2006).  Researchers examining online norms demonstrate that 
these norms are necessary for participation in online communities (Wang and Chen, 
2012) and for people to feel communal obligations online (Mathwick, 2002) just as 
offline norms are necessary for participation and communal obligations in offline 
communities (Putnam, 1993). 
However the instantiation of these norms may differ online and in person.  
Standard behavior on the web might include more conventionally rude remarks, and at 
the same time may not tolerate behavior considered normal in offline work experiences.  
For example, in face-to-face conversations, long pauses in conversation, or taking a break 
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after a question is asked is considered awkward (McLaughlin & Cody, 1982), while such 
habits are the norm in many online chat conversations (Berglund, 2009).   
One example of where people developed online-specific norms for 
communication is in the language they use.  Even as early as 1996, researchers discussed 
“A new variety of English” that is used online (Milena and Belmore, 1996).  Since then 
this language has developed significantly into “netspeak,” as ttyl replaces “talk to you 
later,” and brb replaces “be right back” in most online chats (Netspeak).  These are only 
two examples of the norms of language and speech which have become standard in 
online communication.   
There are also many other online norms developed by participants in online 
communities, such as norms of reciprocity (Mathwick, 2002), self-disclosure (Barak and 
Gluck-Ofri, 2007) and displaying emotions (Glikson and Erez, 2013).  We expect that 
similar to these other norms, online-specific norms for civility have developed as well.  
Some evidence for this exists in the rules posted by online groups reflecting their chosen 
values and preferences.  Most of these lists include (and prioritize) acting civilly.  For 
example Reddit, a social news website, has “Reddiquette – an informal expression of the 
values of many redditors [Reddit users,] as written by redditors themselves.”  Reddiquette 
tells members, among other requests: “Please don’t be rude” (Reddiquette).  “Principles 
of Wikipedia Etiquette” advises contributors to the free online encyclopedia to recognize 
when they are wrong and apologize, and to give credit where it is due (Wikipedia).  
Social networking site Facebook’s list of “Community Standards” says they will take 
action against users who bully others using their site (Facebook, 2012).  What these lists 
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indicate is that members of these forums consider certain types of incivility to violate 
communal norms in online media. 
Online civility norms may be different than norms in face-to-face communication, 
even when both involve talking to customers, employees, and managers.  Since the norms 
differ, the definition of what is considered uncivil differs as well.  Online conversations 
often have a more casual tone (Tat and Carpendale, 2006) however certain norms of 
civility still exist.  To explain online norms of civility, we need to understand 
“conventional social behavior” for online interactions.  We particularly look at online 
chats to see what norms exist for these interactions. 
In this paper we also seek to limit the scope of online norms; our definition of 
online civility norms does not include online shouting, since it  does not necessarily 
violate civility norms and may be an acceptable style of expression.   
 
Trust and Cooperation 
Our goal in understanding online norms is primarily to understand what happens 
when those norms are violated.  As we saw from the work of Porath and Erez (2009,) 
Cortina and colleagues (2001; 2008,) and others, violation of offline norms of civility 
decreases citizenship behavior and appreciation for organizational values.  The question 
we approach in this paper is whether violation of online norms of civility has similar 
effects – particularly when it comes to cooperative citizenship behavior and the value of 
trust. 
There are a number of ways to define trust.  When we consider trust as 
“willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations about another’s 
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behavior,” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998) we can begin to conceive of a 
willingness to trust strangers which brings many benefits to societies (Bahry, Kosolapov, 
Kozyreva & Wilson, 2005).  This trust takes its form in a belief that others will not act 
with intentional acts of deceit (Schweitzer, Hershey & Bradlow, 2006).  
Trust is a critical factor in cooperative relationships.  As discussed in greater 
length in the first section of this dissertation, cooperation that involves risk arising from 
cooperation failures requires trust.  In order to have successful cooperation, parties need a 
mutually rewarding exchange relationship (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  This exchange is 
not just an equal exchange of goods; the basis for exchange can include principles and 
values (Kabanoff, 1991).  This is part of the social approval process, which plays a large 
role in online cooperation (Hemetsberger, 2001).  In order to gain this social approval, an 
online participant must show that she is concerned for the social norms of the group. 
Cortina (2008) found that workplace incivility inhibits cooperation and endangers 
relationships.  A person who is rude, vulgar, and boorish is less likely to be perceived as 
trustworthy by others than one who is kind, nice, and decent (Gill and Sypher, 2009).  
Because of the importance of trust and cooperation to the online community (Mathwick, 
2002), we explore whether these studies regarding workplace incivility and cooperation-
building apply to online incivility.  In other words, we look at whether online incivility 
damages online trust and cooperation. 
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Hypotheses Development 
Online Cooperation 
In online social interactions, contributing to an online group’s benefit may pose a 
risk to a person’s individual benefit.  The less likely the other participants are to 
cooperate, the greater the risk to the individual cooperator.  Therefore when a person 
suspects that others in her group are untrustworthy and unlikely to cooperate, she will be 
less willing to contribute to the group’s benefit, especially if it is a risk to her own 
benefit.  People who are uncivil online show that they are less trustworthy and less likely 
to cooperate , causing others to fear that their cooperation will not be reciprocated and to 
not cooperate themselves. 
 
Hypothesis 1.  Incivility leads to lack of cooperation. 
 
Online Trust 
In many aspects of life, particularly digital life (Ozer, 2005), cooperation involves 
a risk that other people may not cooperate.  If people do not trust that the other parties 
will contribute to the overall benefit, the individuals will not risk cooperating.  In these 
scenarios, which are very common when people work together online (Mathwick, 2002; 
Ozer, 2005), trust is required to promote cooperation. 
As discussed earlier, online and offline relationships differ in that what one 
person types to another is often the only information the other has about her.  Therefore, 
parties interested in a trusting online relationship need to give a digital signal indicating 
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that they agree with certain principles and values; with this signal they show that they are 
likely to follow the social norms of the group. 
Researchers show that displays of emotion can act as a signal about a person’s 
beliefs and intentions.  For example, Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead (2004) describe 
“tracking behavior,” in which individuals use their opponents’ expressed emotions to 
locate their limits in negotiations.  Incivility is not an emotion, but it can similarly signify 
beliefs and intentions.  Civility is a demonstration of respect, signaling an agreement with 
principles and values.  Incivility, on the other hand, demonstrates disregard for others in a 
violation of norms for respect (Pearson and Porath 2005).  Violating online norms for 
respect by acting (or typing) uncivilly demonstrates disregard for others and signals that 
the violator does not agree with the principles and values of the other. 
In order to trust others, people must believe that the trustee is going to follow 
group norms and do what the group expects of her.  Displaying online incivility is a 
negative signal, indicating that a person does not follow online norms and is less likely to 
act in a socially accepted way.  Therefore the uncivil online actor indicates that she can’t 
be trusted to fulfill her online social obligations. 
 
Hypothesis 2.  Incivility leads to lack of trust. 
 
Online Rapport 
Similarly, uncivil language online acts as a signal that a person is less likely to 
pull her weight in the relationship.  This fractures their “mutual positivity and interest,” 
defined as rapport (Nadler, 2003).  Rapport is critical to successful negotiations and is 
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linked to lower incidence of impasse and to higher satisfaction in negotiation results (Jap, 
Robertson and Hamilton, 2011; Nadler, 2003). 
A critical aspect of rapport is that the parties are well coordinated and that each 
can predict the other’s response (Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal, 1990).  But when one 
party writes in violation of online norms she indicates that her responses are not easily 
predictable.  When a person feels that she has stronger relationships with the other group 
members and has confidence in the other members’ future actions, she will be more 
likely to come to mutually beneficial agreements with other members of the group.  
However when a person writes uncivilly, she indicates that she is not interested in a 
strong working relationship and that she is unlikely to fulfill her obligations to sustain 
such a relationship.  
 
Hypothesis 3.  Incivility leads to lower rapport. 
 
 The trust we discussed in this paper is based on a belief in the other person’s 
likelihood of acting in your favor.  When people do not have a strong relationship they 
will be perceived as less likely to act favorably towards each other, especially if it means 
sacrificing for the other.    Therefore, we expect that people who experience online 
incivility will experience lower rapport with the uncivil person, and because of that will 
also trust the uncivil person less. 
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Online Shouting 
Our explanation of the effects of incivility relies on the premise that incivility is a 
signal to the group that a person is not following social norms and is detached from the 
group.  This detachment leads to suspicion about a person’s future behavior, and 
therefore lowers the perceived trust, rapport and cooperation which the individual 
receives.  However, certain behaviors exist which although seemingly “uncivil” in 
colloquial terms, are not in violation of online norms.  We should expect then that this 
behavior does not impact trust, cooperation and rapport the way norm-violating behavior 
does. 
One example of seemingly uncivil behavior which may not violate online norms 
is shouting.  Shouting can be expressed digitally through the use of capital letters other 
than at the beginning of a sentence or for proper nouns, which we will call CAPS in the 
rest of the paper.
35
 
Shouting is often considered uncivil in face-to-face communication (Philips and 
Smith, 2004,) but shouting online through the use of CAPS may be a common and 
accepted form of voice in digital communication (Glikson and Erez, 2013).  Therefore 
online shouting would not be in violation of online norms. 
There are many reasons why CAPS may be used in online conversations.  Some 
people use it by accident, while others use it to express tone, excitement, emphasis, or 
anger.  Often CAPS is used as the equivalent of showing strong emotions in a face-to-
                                                             
 
35 Illustrating this, one video entitled Accidentally hitting “Caps Lock” in Real Life, 
depicts a person randomly shouting in the middle of a sentence (Horseless Productions, 
2012). 
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face conversation, essentially replacing emotional facial cues (Byron, 2008; Glikson and 
Erez, 2013).  Even in the same digital conversation people may use CAPS differently.  
For example, in an online discussion of a rainbow cake recipe (Burneko, 2014), some 
people commented: 
Irene: How long do you freeze the numbers? 
peb: till they are FROZEN 
[berating of question asker and responder]… 
Seriously: oh good GOD, it is a cake recipe site… 
sparkysmom: Well, I WOULD JUST LIKE TO LET YOU KNOW, THAT 
I HAVE BEEN DOING CAKES SINCE BACK IN THE 70’S… [22 
lines later, all of which in CAPS] –BLESSINGS TO ALL-NANCY 
[discussion of whether liberal politics means people should be allowed to 
say what they want]… 
Jim in Hayward: YOU are the dummy stupid bitch! Liberal… meaning 
Free, as in FREE TO SPEAK YOUR MIND… such a stoooopid 
bitch! 
Denise: Good grief it’s a cake recipe… No wonder we (America) can’t get 
anywhere or get along!!!!! ITS A CAKE!!!! 
 
 In this one conversation thread, shouting is used to indicate anger, emphasis, and 
(it seems for “sparkysmom,”) accidentally leaving the Caps Lock on.  There are many 
reasons why CAPS may be used, many of which are norm-abiding.  Although online 
yelling may be considered uncouth, it is not necessarily norm-violating online behavior. 
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Previous research on shouting and other expressions of anger in negotiation 
settings are inconsistent (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; de Melo, Carnevale, & 
Gratch, 2011; Friedman, Anderson, Brett, Olekalns, Goates & Lisco, 2004; Sinaceur & 
Tiedens, 2004; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007).  In some studies, angry expressions trigger 
angry responses and lower resolution rates, and sometimes they don’t.  Some researchers 
look for distinctions between the two responses to anger, finding results relating to power 
disparity (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007), availability of alternatives (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 
2004), vulnerability (Friedman, et al., 2004), and whether participants knowingly 
negotiated with a computer (de Melo et al., 2011).  However these papers discuss the 
effects of anger on the angry opponent’s conceding, competing, or demanding, and not on 
whether they will trust or cooperate differently.  Friedman et al. (2004) get the closest to 
discussing cooperation, as they research anger expressions in mediation, however their 
dispute resolution setting also differs from the trust-building negotiation setting discussed 
in this paper.  Furthermore, most of these papers analyze anger that is directed at offers, 
not anger directed at the opponents themselves (de Melo et al, 2011; Steinel, Van Kleef 
& Harinck, 2008).  Therefore we can conclude that there is no conclusion; no theory 
clearly shows that anger will affect trust-building in situations where the individuals have 
other alternatives and similar power, such as is the case in most anonymous online chats. 
Prior research supports the claim that shouting and expressing anger in general do 
not violate norms (Litvak, Lerner, Tiedens, & Shonk, 2010); they are frequently 
experienced in negotiation settings (Allred, et al., 1997) and are commonplace in online 
and offline interactions (Allred, et al., 1997; Averill, 1983).  Therefore we expect that 
online shouting does not violate online norms.  This claim is further supported by 
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research conducted by Van Kleef and Côté (2007).  They looked at computer-mediated 
negotiation simulations and saw that anger at times increased cooperation and at times 
decreased cooperation, depending on the disparity in power between the parties and on 
whether the anger expressed violated a specified rule.  Some participants received an 
explanation that the ethics committee had established a strict rule which stated that 
participants were not allowed to express negative emotions during the negotiation.  In 
their research, only participants who are told about this rule demand more in the 
negotiation.  When participants negotiate with an angry opponent who has not violated a 
stated rule, they react in similar ways as when they negotiate with an non-angry opponent 
(Van Kleef and Côté, 2007, figures 2 & 3).  In other words, expressing anger without a 
specified rule saying that anger is wrong in this scenario does not affect negotiation 
outcomes.  This result is easily explained by the theory that anger is expected in 
computer-mediated negotiations; participants who are explicitly told that there is a rule 
against expressing anger see this as a violation, but those who are not do not see angry 
behavior as violating any unspoken norms. 
There is no theory which demonstrates that negatively-toned shouting in 
anonymous online chats would affect levels of trust and cooperation, and furthermore, 
using CAPS to express positive emotions can be helpful in building trust (Glikson and 
Erez, 2013).  Given these factors, and the theory that incivility violates online norms 
(causing less trust and cooperation) while shouting does not, we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 4.  Online incivility leads to a greater lack of trust and less cooperation than 
do shouting expressions online without incivility.  
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Empirical Studies 
 
We used a number of different approaches to establish norms of online civility 
and what constitutes violation of those norms.  First we analyzed text messages sent in a 
prisoner’s dilemma-like cooperation game.  Then we used computer-generated civil and 
uncivil comments to show the effects of online incivility.  We then collected and tested a 
broader range of examples of online incivility and anger.  Using these definitions we 
conducted two additional studies to understand what happens when people act with 
online incivility and CAPS. 
We test our hypotheses with lab-like manipulations and field-like quasi 
experiments.  None of the studies take place in the actual lab or a traditional experimental 
field, since they were all conducted online. 
 
Study 1 
In study 1 we analyze data from a prisoners’ dilemma-like game to look at the 
effects of online incivility in a cooperative negotiation setting. 
 
Method 
Participants.  Undergraduate and MBA students at a U.S. business school played 
this game for credit in a negotiations class.  For this study we looked at 509 games, 
involving 1,527 teams and approximately 4,500 students between 2003 and 2010. In 
approximately 95% of the classes, students are graded on the outcome of the results.  
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Professors and students from the graded and ungraded classes say anecdotally that 
students take the game seriously.   
 
Procedure.  The game is a simulation of OPEC decision making designed by 
Maurice Schweitzer and run by the Wharton Learning Lab (Schweitzer, University of 
Pennsylvania).  Each game setting, or “world,” consists of 3 “countries.”  Countries 
usually have 2-4 members.  Each country sits in a different room with a computer screen.  
Each country simultaneously decides how much oil to produce for that round.  
Participants are then told the results of the round, and play another round.  All countries 
are given the same profit function, which depends on the quantity which that individual 
country produced and the price per barrel.
36
  Marginal cost is constant.  The price is 
decided based on total production of the world (the more produced, the lower the price).  
The goal for each country is to maximize profit.  (See Appendix E for full instructions.) 
The number of rounds (between eight and twenty-five) and simulation events are 
decided by the professor prior to the game.  These details are not given to the students 
before the game.  They do not know how many rounds of the game will be played.  They 
do know how much time is allotted for the game, and the final round is announced before 
their final round decisions.  During each round the students see a screen summarizing the 
world’s activities in prior rounds.  After they play the game, the students analyze the 
results together with the professor and the rest of the class. 
                                                             
 
36 Students are provided the formula Profit=Qi(P-C) where Qi = country’s output, P = 
price, and C = marginal cost. 
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The OPEC simulation presents a prisoner’s dilemma for the countries involved.  
One equilibrium outcome is for each country to defect (produce at a high level).  By 
increasing production, each country increases its own profit, regardless of the production 
levels of the other countries (assuming price is greater than marginal cost).  However a 
long-term strategy is likely to incorporate the attempt to encourage other countries to 
produce low amounts in future rounds, to keep the world price high.  Since the students 
do not know how many rounds there are, different strategies may arise (e.g. tit-for-tat) for 
playing the iterated prisoner’s dilemma.  However, from a theoretical perspective, there is 
no one “best strategy” in this type of game (Axelrod, 1984). 
In addition to short-term outcomes of the simulation, students playing this game 
are concerned about their reputations.  In future classes they are likely to be paired with 
their teammates or counterparts from this game.  In many classes they will have to 
explain their behavior in the class discussion or informal discussions following the game.  
In some classes students grade each other at the end of the semester on preparation and 
skills.  Most importantly, these students often have (or want) long-term relationships with 
their counterparts, in and out of class.  The variation in the strength and length of the 
long-term relationships in this game provides a realistic basis for studying the effects of 
incivility in online communication.  
 
Measures 
Cooperation.  The profit-maximizing production for each world is 38 barrels per 
country per round.  If all three countries in a world produce at this level, the resulting 
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price is $35.80 per barrel.  Transcripts of messages sent between countries as well as 
discussions with the students indicate that the students immediately recognize 38 as the 
cooperative production level. 
We measure cooperative behavior using production per world in each round.  The 
more cooperative the countries are, the closer each country’s production will be to 38 
million barrels.
37
  When countries defect, they produce more barrels for higher individual 
country profitability, at the expense of world profitability.  We measure higher 
cooperation as lower production. 
The price of a barrel is determined by the number of barrels all three countries in 
a world produce in a given round.  Thus people in a cooperating world will have higher 
prices and therefore higher profitability over the course of the game.  In this game, we 
use cumulative profitability as a way of measuring medium-term cooperation among 
world members. 
 
Incivility.  Simulation events are decided by the class’ professor before the game. 
These include whether at a pre-determined point in the game, countries may send one-
line messages to other countries in their world.  Two research assistants coded these 
messages for incivility, and were told to specifically look for what Pearson and Porath 
                                                             
 
37
 In some games a fourth computer-generated country is added to the world, which 
produces a random small number of barrels.  This addition affects ideal production 
slightly.  In 99% of the games we studied, participants produce at or above ideal 
production.   
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(2009) describe as workplace incivility: Demeaning or derogatory remarks, taking credit, 
passing blame, talking down, speaking poorly about others, belittling other’s efforts, 
shutting one group out of the team, showing little interest in other’s opinions, acting 
irritated, or cursing.  For example, one team, irritated with Capita’s performance, wrote, 
“Again, we will be better off if we cooperate. We are glancing at you, Capita. [One of our 
teammates] knows who you are and will hunt you down and punch you if you go above.”  
Another team wrote, “knock it off, C [Capita] Don’t be a jackass.”   
The research assistants were only shown the individual messages, and were not 
shown messages from the same country at the same time.  They were blind to the 
production, price, and profits of countries and worlds.  The two research assistants had 
.66 correlation on the incivility coding.  For the purposes of this study, only the messages 
which both researchers coded as uncivil were measured as uncivil. 
We also asked the research assistants to code the messages for whether the 
participants expressed anger.  Here too we used the messages which both assistants coded 
as angry. 
 
Results 
First we looked at the difference in production between groups which receive 
uncivil messages and those which do not.  In the round following a message, mean 
production for the teams receiving uncivil messages was 52.98 million barrels (N = 818, 
SD = 0.54).  In contrast, production in rounds following receipt of messages which were 
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not uncivil was 46.94 (N = 4161 SD = 0.22).  This is a difference of 6.03, indicating a 
12% increase (p<0.001) for countries which received uncivil messages.  
Production in an individual round is heavily affected by the number of rounds 
already played (identified by the round number).  Additionally, the production of 
countries in each round is highly determined by the anchor of the price in the first round.  
We include both of these factors in an ordinary least squares regression of production in 
rounds with messages.  This also shows that recipients of uncivil messages have on 
average significantly higher production following that round (p<0.001).  What we see in 
this study is that there is lower cooperation from recipients of incivility in digital 
communication, using definitions of incivility taken from workplace incivility 
(Hypothesis 1). 
 We also compared teams’ receipt of uncivil messages to receipt of angry 
messages.
38
 In an ordinary least squares regression, we found that while both types of 
negatively-toned messages are likely to result in an increase in production (a decrease in 
cooperation,) uncivil messages had significantly more of an impact than angry messages.  
We assumed that displaying anger in this context does not violate norms.  In fact, many 
of the students feel that anger is justified and expected in certain negotiations.  Therefore 
displaying anger in this game did not affect cooperation as strongly as incivility 
(Hypothesis 4). 
 
                                                             
 
38
 450 teams received uncivil messages during the game; 49 teams received angry 
messages. 
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Table F1. Effect of incivility and anger on production following the message 
 
 We also ran a difference in differences test to look at how the message round 
affected a team’s performance.  For countries which received uncivil messages, the mean 
production in rounds after messages was 52.98 (N=818, SD = 0.54) and the mean 
production for all other rounds was 54.32 (N = 4153, SD = 0.24).  For these teams, 
production decreased slightly after message rounds.  For countries which did not receive 
uncivil messages, mean production after messages decreased more substantially, from 
49.48 (N=11,348, SD = 0.14) to 46.94 (N = 4161, SD = 0.22).  Regardless of the 
incivility in the messages, sending a message at all encouraged lower production (greater 
cooperation).  However when messages were uncivil they were less effective at 
promoting cooperation than when they were civil (Hypothesis 1). 
 To measure medium-term cooperation as a result of incivility, we tested the 
cumulative profitability of countries which did and did not receive uncivil messages.  
Countries which received uncivil messages had on average $12,205.56 total profit from 
the whole game (N=450, SD = 179.76).  Countries which did not receive uncivil 
messages had on average $13,522.11 total profit (N=1077, SD=125.87).  An ordinary 
least squares regression of total game profitability which controls for the number of 
rounds in the game showed that countries which received uncivil messages had 
significantly lower total profits from the game (p<0.001) (Hypothesis 1). 
 
Table F2.  Effects of receiving uncivil messages on total game profitability 
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 We also measured total game profitability of countries which themselves were 
uncivil (N=272).  This averaged $11,857.47, approximately $1,500 less than countries 
which were not uncivil.  An ordinary least squares regression shows that even when 
controlling for the number of rounds and the first round price, uncivil teams fare 
significantly worse over the course of the game (p<0.001).  Here we see that incivility in 
this context discourages cooperation from the receivers of incivility and harms the profits 
of the uncivil actors. 
 
Table F3. Effects of sending uncivil messages on total game profitability 
 
Discussion 
 The prisoner’s dilemma game we analyzed in Study 1 requires significant trust 
among participants that the other countries in their worlds will not defect and over-
produce.  This trust creates cooperation which in turn brings higher profitability.  We 
found that participants who received uncivil online messages cooperated less than those 
who received other messages, both in the short-term (in the round following the uncivil 
message) and in the medium-term (throughout the entire game).  Showing anger in these 
discussions did not significantly affect cooperation.  However unlike anger, incivility 
lowered levels of cooperation.  We assume that lower cooperation indicates a lack of trust 
of the uncivil teams and examine this aspect of online relationships further in the next 
study.   
 Additionally we found in Study 1 that incivility in cooperative negotiations does 
not pay for either the uncivil party or the recipient of incivility.  Cooperation and 
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profitability for both of these groups was lower than for those who were neither uncivil 
nor saw uncivil messages. 
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Study 2 
 
The purpose of Study 2 is to explore whether people who experience incivility 
view uncivil people as less trustworthy.  We also used this study to test whether incivility 
affects participants’ perceptions of rapport. 
 
Method 
Participants.  Two-hundred and fifty Mechanical Turk online survey participants 
were recruited to play an online quiz game in exchange for a small reward. 
 
Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned to uncivil, civil1, civil2, or no 
response teammates.  After consenting to the study, but before playing the game, 
participants were told they would work together with another online participant to answer 
trivia questions.  Participants were required to wait 10 seconds for their partners to join. 
Participants then interacted with a computerized “confederate.”  They were told 
that they have an opportunity to introduce themselves to their teammates by writing a 
short message.  They then waited 3 seconds, following which they saw a message from 
the computerized confederate.  Participants then answered three trivia questions and were 
told what the correct answers were and the total number of questions they and their 
teammate answered correctly.  Then participants had a second opportunity to interact 
with their teammates, in the same fashion as before. 
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In the second part of the study, the participants were led to believe they were 
playing a game with the same teammate (modeled after the investment game by Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe (1995)): 
 
You will play the next game with the same teammate.  In addition to your participation 
fee, you will receive $3.  (Your teammate doesn't receive this additional money but will 
be told that you are receiving it.) 
You decide how much of this $3 to send to your teammate.  Your teammate will receive 
triple the amount that you send.  Then your teammate will decide how much of the tripled 
money to send back to you. 
For example, if you send $5, your teammate will receive $15 and will decide whether to 
give you any amount between zero and $15. 
Your total earnings will be the sum of the money you keep now and the money your 
teammate returns to you.  
 
Participants were then given an example and test questions to ensure they 
understood the game.  Participants who answered these questions correctly then made 
offers to their teammates.  All participants answered survey questions about incivility, 
rapport and trust after they made an offer but before they received the confederate’s 
response to the game. 
At the end of the questions, people answered whether they thought they were 
playing with a real person.  Those who responded no (51%) were excluded from the 
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analysis.  113 participants were included in the final analysis (53% male, average age 34, 
all living in the United States) of whom 78 (58% male, average age 34,) played the trust 
game. 
 
Uncivil Manipulation.  For this study we solicited uncivil lines from colleagues, 
rejected the high-intensity comments, and pre-tested the manipulations to determine 
validity of the uncivil and civil teammate interactions. In the pre-test we combined the 
remarks in different combinations and asked participants to rate incivility. We chose the 
uncivil combinations which had the strongest incivility while still being reasonably 
believable in this context. 
In the first uncivil condition, participants saw their teammates write, “I don’t have 
time for this. can we get it over quickly?” (Sic) and then “I did a fucking good job”  In 
the second uncivil condition, participants saw “Mark” and then “go ahead and make 
pathetic excuses you want”  (Sic).  In the civil condition, participants saw “Hi, I’m Mark. 
I’m looking forward to working on this with you” and then “I’m happy with this 
outcome, I hope you are too....”  In the no response condition, participants saw “<no 
message>” during both interactions. 
 
Measures 
Online Trust and Belief in Reciprocity.  The trust game in this study is modeled 
after the investment game designed by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995).  This game 
was designed to test the extent to which self-interested rational thought guides human 
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behavior and where trust plays an important role.  The prediction based on the unique 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is that the participants would not send any money.  
However what Berg et al. (1995) found was that 55 out of 60 times they did send money.  
The authors explain that, “Subjects were willing to place a trust, by risking some amount 
of money, in the belief that there would be reciprocity.” 
In our study we measure trust using a continuous variable of how much money 
the participants send.  We compare the amounts sent by participants in civil, uncivil, and 
no response conditions.  We also test the assumption made by Berg et al. (1995) that 
willingness to risk is based on a belief in reciprocity by explicitly asking participants how 
much money they expect to receive in return.  To verify the internal reliability of the trust 
game, we ask participants a series of questions regarding the trustworthiness of their 
teammates, based on Johnson-George and Swap (1982) and Dunn and Schweitzer (2005). 
(See Appendix A.)  Participants were also asked questions about their teammate’s 
competence and warmth (also termed “positive affect”) adapted from Fiske, Cuddy, 
Glick, and Xu (2002). (See Appendix C.) 
 
Online Incivility.  To test whether incivility similar to workplace incivility exists 
online, and to test the effectiveness of the incivility manipulation, we asked participants 
about the level of incivility of their teammate, using questions based on Cortina, Magley, 
Williams & Langhout’s (2001) discussion of workplace incivility.  (See Appendix E.) 
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Online Rapport.  Our hypothesis is that incivility affects the possibility of 
relationship-building which in turn inhibits cooperation.  To help us understand this 
mechanism, participants answered questions about rapport with their teammate, adapted 
from Jap, Robertson and Hamilton (2011). (See Appendix B.) 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Incivility.  Results show that participants who received any type of uncivil 
message (cursing, “pathetic excuses,” and no response,) considered their teammates 
uncivil according to Cortina et al.’s standards of workplace incivility. 
 
Table G1. OLS of survey responses following uncivil and civil messages 
 
Trust.  Both surveyed trust measures and results from the trust game indicated 
that incivility has a large detrimental effect on trust.  The average offer in the trust game 
was $1.33 out of a possible $3.  Of those who played the trust game, 40 received uncivil 
messages.  These participants offered an average of $1.17.  Eleven (28%) of these 
participants offered zero, and the average of the non-zero offers was $1.62.  The 
participants who received civil messages offered $1.46 on average.  Only two (12%) of 
these participants offered zero to their teammates and the average of the non-zero offers 
was $1.66.  These findings show that people had less trust in the confederate when they 
received uncivil messages than when they received civil messages (Hypothesis 2). 
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Table G2. Mean offers in trust game following uncivil and civil messages 
 
The difference between the offers can be explained by the expectations 
participants had from their teammates.  Participants with uncivil teammates who offered 
more than zero expected on average 27.31% of the tripled amount to be returned to them 
while those with civil teammates who offered more than zero expected on average a 
return of 39.47%, meaning that they would recoup their investment.  The post-game 
survey confirmed that the participants receiving uncivil messages distrusted their 
teammates relative to those receiving civil messages (Hypothesis 2).  The correlation 
between survey-measured trust and offers in the game was 0.42, however both of these 
measures independently support the hypothesis that incivility leads to lack of trust. 
 
Rapport and Positive Affect.  The participants who received uncivil messages also 
felt lower rapport with their teammates and thought their teammates had less warmth and 
competence (p<0.01).  The warmth measures mediate between the incivility condition 
and the trust measures (p<0.001).  This supports our hypothesis that people who receive 
uncivil online messages view the uncivil sender as violating social norms, and are 
therefore less likely to develop a trusting relationship with them (Hypothesis 3) and will 
view them as less trustworthy (Hypothesis 2). 
 
Figure 2. Study 2 mediation analysis 
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Study 3 
 
In studies 1 and 2 we assume that offline workplace definitions of incivility 
(talking down, taking credit, cursing, etc.) apply to online discussions.  In study 3 we 
challenge this assumption to question which particular online behaviors are considered 
uncivil. Additionally, we want to distinguish between uncivil online behavior and angry 
online behavior, so we conducted two pilot studies to collect and rate uncivil and angry 
online behavior.  In this study we were testing two separate ideas – online incivility 
(violation of online norms of mutual respect) and online anger (online expression of the 
emotion of anger, not necessarily in violation of online norms). 
 
Study 3a 
First we solicited suggestions from 99 Mechanical Turk participants, asking them 
“What are some things that uncivil (angry) people do in online chats, emails, and text 
messages?”  We also asked them to rank this behavior in terms of incivility and anger for 
each of the digital scenarios. 
The average age of these participants was 32.3 (ranging from 19-68) and 51 were 
in the Millennial generation (aged 19-30 in 2013).  This generation was isolated because 
they are often considered the shapers of online norms, especially regarding interaction 
through social media and online messages (Howe and Strauss, 2007). 
From this pilot we found that the highest ranked examples of online incivility by 
both Millennials and non-Millennials were sexual or pornographic messages, cursing, and 
racist/offensive language.  Flirting was considered uncivil by non-Millennials. 
154 
Participants found foul or derogatory language and the use of CAPS to show 
significant online anger.  Additionally, Millennials rated logging off in the middle of a 
chat session to show significant anger.  In this study we did not directly ask participants 
to differentiate between anger that violates online norms and anger that does not violate 
online norms, but we did find that although both cursing and CAPS showed anger, 
cursing was ranked as more strongly uncivil. 
 
Study 3b 
 Method.  We tested the highly uncivil and angry examples in a chatting context.  
Using a story that we were trying to help tutors learn how to deal with different parents, 
we showed participants a fabricated chat in which a tutor solicited clients. The parents in 
the chat responded to the tutor with either norm-violating incivility (cursing, racist 
comments, or sexually suggestive messages,) norm-abiding expressions of anger (through 
the use of CAPS,) or neutral chats. (See Appendix G.)  We switched the gender of the 
tutor and the parent so that for each condition some participants saw a male parent and a 
male tutor, a female parent and a male tutor, a male parent and a female tutor, or a female 
parent and a female tutor.  
Mechanical Turk participants were randomly assigned to each incivility condition 
and gender condition.  They were asked to read the chats and then rate whether they 
thought the parents were civil or uncivil (on a 5-point scale,) or angry (on a 3-point 
scale).  Participants were then asked to rate the parents’ chats in the interactions 
according to the features of workplace incivility that Cortina et al. (2001) describe 
(Appendix D).  Participants also answered questions about levels of trust, warmth and 
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competence (termed “positive affect,”) and negative affect they felt regarding the parents 
in the chats (adopted from Fiske, et al., 2002 and Dunn, Ruedy, and Schweitzer, 2012) 
(Appendices B and C). 
 
Results.  The 421 participants from the United States ranked the cursing, racist 
comments, and CAPS as very angry. These rankings were highly significant when 
compared to the polite condition (p<0.001) even when controlling for age, gender of the 
participants, and gender of the stories’ characters.  Furthermore, participants ranked 
cursing as significantly more uncivil than racist comments (p<0.05) or CAPS (p<0.001).  
This suggests that although using CAPS often shows anger, it does not violate online 
norms to the same extent as cursing and is therefore not considered as uncivil. 
On the survey measures, all four types of incivility were rated lower on trust and 
positive affect, and rated higher on negative affect, when controlling for age and gender 
of the participants (p<0.001).   
 
Table H1. OLS of survey responses following story prompts 
 
Discussion 
In study 3 we defined certain online behaviors which are considered uncivil.  We 
also differentiated online cursing as significantly more uncivil than the other forms of 
incivility we tested.  This indicates that people consider cursing a significant violation of 
online norms. 
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In this study we also saw how viewing incivility in an online conversation affects 
a third party’s perception of the uncivil typist.  Reading uncivil chats – particularly 
cursing, racist comments, and sexually suggestive messages – lowers the third party’s 
perception of the uncivil person’s trustworthiness, warmth, and competence.  
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Study 4 
 
 In study 2 we showed that people interacting with an uncivil person online have 
lower trust and rapport.  However, approximately half the participants recognized that the 
confederate was a fake.  Therefore we conducted an additional study which follows a 
similar methodology except that instead of a computer response we had real people 
interact with each other. We then analyzed the effects of incivility and CAPS in the chat 
messages based on the forms of online incivility we discovered in study 3. 
 
Method 
 Participants.  252 Mechanical Turk online survey participants were recruited to 
read an article and play an online game in exchange for a small reward. 
 
Procedure.  Participants read an article about a physician whose patient tells him 
he committed a crime.  The participants were then paired with each other and chatted 
online with their partners for five minutes.  They were asked to chat about the article, 
which 81% did.  Then participants played the same trust game from Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe (1995) as in study 2.  They were also asked the same set of survey questions 
about positive affect. 
A research assistant coded the texts of the chats for whether they had a 
conversation and whether they chatted uncivilly.  Since the participants do not know each 
other’s race or gender, we did not code for racist comments or sexually suggestive 
messages in this study.  Instead we looked at cursing and use of CAPS. 
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Results 
  Some of the participants did not have conversations, as they preferred to spend the 
five minutes doing something else.  These participants were excluded from our results.  
We analyzed the results from 204 participants, of which 200 played the trust game.  (Two 
pairs did not answer the test questions about the trust game correctly and did not play.)  
Some participants discussed the issues and came to an agreement, as in the following 
example: 
P1: what do you think about it? 
P2: I think he should do as he [the author] suggested. […] 
P1: i thought it was very interesting. i can understand both sides. but i agree with 
the non  
doctor writer. 
 P2: I agree.  […]  
P1: actually thinking even more about it  
the dr could have just told the cops […] 
P2: yes i agree. 
 
In other conversations, the participants took different sides of the argument.  For 
example: 
P3: What did you think of the :dilemma"? 
P4: It is very complicated 
 and I think there is no right thing to do 
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What about you? 
P3: I do not believe that the Hippocratic Oath cover criminal confessions 
P4: I think it cover everything 
P3: I believe it only covers things that are medically relevant  
 
Cursing.  Only two of the conversations coded included cursing, so we did not 
analyze the effect cursing had on the game outcome.  However the fact that cursing did 
not frequently arise in these natural conversations may itself indicate that cursing violates 
online norms. 
 
Capital letters (CAPS).  Overall, 28 participants (in 13 unique conversations) 
used CAPS in one form or another.  Some people used CAPS as their “voice” throughout 
the entire discussion, but most people used CAPS for a few words as a way of 
emphasizing a point or showing emotion.  At times CAPS was applied to just one word.  
For example, in a heated debate about the physician’s responsibilities, participants wrote: 
P5: I agree with trying to tell the patient to confess 
I'm not sure if revealing violates patient-doctor confidentiality though 
P6: TRUE 
 but I do think that ultimately the innocent persons life could be in danger - 
prison is dangerous. 
 
Here P6 capitalized the word “TRUE” to show emphasis and interest. 
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In analyzing the trust game, we only looked at the first mover, since she is the 
only player who has to trust (the other either upholds the trust or keeps the money for 
herself.)  On average, the 100 people who played the first mover gave $1.92 (out of $3).  
The 13 first movers whose conversations included CAPS gave on average $2.08, slightly 
higher but not significantly different from the average. 
The use of CAPS had a significant impact on the positive affect survey measures.  
The average positive affect measurement of 8 items, on a 7-point Likert scale, was 43.65 
overall and 46.45 for the 26 participants whose conversations included CAPS.  Though 
the positive affect scale had high overall internal consistency (alpha=0.97) we were 
interested in understanding what aspects of positive affect were particularly high for 
CAPS.  What we found was that two items – trustworthiness and sincerity – accounted 
for most of the “extra” positive affect among people who had CAPS in their 
conversations. 
 
Table I1. OLS of CAPS effect on individual positive affect items 
 
Discussion 
Use of CAPS is commonplace in digital communication, and therefore is not in 
violation of online norms.  The results from study 4 suggest that people who use CAPS in 
these conversations seem more sincere and are highly trusted.  It also suggests that 
CAPS, though it is usually meant to indicate strong emotion, is not considered to be a 
norm-defying type of online behavior, and does not affect how much people are willing 
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to trust (Hypothesis 4).  CAPS is considered an acceptable form of expressing emphasis 
or tone. 
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Study 5 
 
Because strong incivility such as cursing did not arise naturally in study 4, we 
tested incivility in a more direct study. 
 
Method 
 Participants.  We recruited 152 Mechanical Turk participants who had not 
participated in any of the previous studies to read an article and play a game. 
 
Procedure.  Similar to study 4, participants read an article, (either about gun 
control or same sex marriage,) chatted for 3 minutes, played the trust game, (as in studies 
2 and 4) and then answered survey questions about their teammates.  The main difference 
is that in study 5 a (human) confederate chatted with participants and acted as the trustee 
in the trust game.  Based on the results of study 3, participants were randomly assigned to 
incivility (cursing,) CAPS, or neutral condition.  The research assistant chatted with each 
participant based on the random assignment. 
132 people participated via Mechanical Turk and played the trust game.  Of those, 
57 were in the cursing condition, 33 in CAPS, and 42 in the neutral condition.  Twenty 
participants did not have conversations or did not play the game due to technical 
problems. 
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Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check.  We asked participants to rate the incivility of their 
teammates.  Those who chatted with a cursing confederate had significantly higher 
incivility ratings than those in the neutral condition (p<0.05,) whereas those who chatted 
with a CAPS-using confederate did not rate their partners as particularly uncivil.  This 
confirms our previous finding that CAPS is not considered norm-defying in digital 
conversations. 
 
Trust.  The cursing incivility condition negatively affected trust in this game, as 
people in that test condition sent $1.54 on average (out of $3,) compared with $1.75 sent 
on average by participants in the neutral condition (Hypothesis 2).  In contrast, those who 
were spoken to with CAPS sent an average of $1.71, just slightly less than those in the 
neutral condition. 
After they sent money in the trust game, but before they found out how much 
money they received in return, we asked participants how much money they expect the 
other person to send back.  The purpose of this question was to check that the results of 
the game were actually showing whether the participant trusted the other person – that is, 
whether they were willing to take a risk because they believed that the other person 
would reciprocate.  We analyzed these figures as percentages of the amount they sent and 
found that cursing during the chat significantly lowered the percentage people expected 
to receive in return (p<0.05) (Hypothesis 2).  Using CAPS, however, did not significantly 
affect the mean expected return (Hypothesis 4). 
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Table J1. Mean offers in trust game following online chats 
 
The results from the surveys following the game (but before they learned how 
much money would be returned) corroborated the analysis of the game.  Even when 
controlling for gender, age, which article they discussed, whether they felt strongly about 
the issue in the article and whether they agreed with the confederate, cursing in the chat 
negatively affected the answers to the trust (p<0.05) and positive affect (p<0.01) surveys.  
Additionally, the responses to the trust questionnaire indicate that trust mediated between 
the type of incivility and the amount of money sent in the game (p<0.001). 
 
Table J2. OLS of survey responses following online chats 
Figure 4. Study 5 mediation analysis 
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General Discussion 
 
 In these studies we found that cursing is one example of online incivility - low-
intensity deviant behavior which violates online norms.  Moreover, the effects of this 
type of incivility are not contained to the traditional workplace.  Instead we found that 
incivility from a stranger online affects perceptions of the uncivil person’s positive affect 
and warmth.  Such incivility endangers the ability of the uncivil party to develop 
relationships involving rapport and trustworthiness. 
We found that people lower their expectations of trustworthy behavior when 
confronted with uncivil remarks from strangers online.  They are less willing to accept 
vulnerability based on such behavior, and are less trusting of uncivil individuals online.  
People are also less likely to cooperate with those who curse during digital interactions, 
especially if there is a risk to their personal benefit. 
What we see in these studies is that just as workplace incivility is a form of 
antisocial employee behavior (Andersson and Pearson, 1999) – online incivility is a form 
of antisocial virtual behavior.  And just as workplace incivility inhibits cooperation and 
endangers relationships (Cortina 2008) – online incivility inhibits online cooperation and 
challenges online relationships. 
In the scenarios we looked at, online incivility harmed the efficiency of 
interactions in a way which hurt the uncivil person and the receiver of incivility. These 
findings are particularly important because of the unique features of today’s modern 
workplace.  On the one hand, a large extent of modern communication with bosses, 
colleagues, and clients new and old is conducted online.  On the other hand, the old-
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fashioned notions of cooperation and trust still play major roles in business’ success 
(Somers and Nelson, 2001). 
Additionally, in this paper we began to explore the different types of online 
incivility.  We show that use of CAPS does not discourage trust to the same extent as 
cursing.  This supports our theory that only norm-violating incivility which signals a 
deviance from the group causes distrust, lack of cooperation, and lower rapport.  
However use of capital letters, while often indicating yelling, does not deviate from 
online norms and therefore does not have the same detrimental effect on trust and 
rapport. 
We also found another interesting outcome of our studies which we do not discuss 
in this paper.  The participants in our studies saw people who displayed online incivility 
as being less competent relative to civil people.  This was true for all of the studies in 
which we asked participants about competence (as part of positive affect).
39
  The 
correlation of incivility and perception of competence is an interesting finding and 
requires further research to understand the theory and mechanisms involved. 
Online norms vary considerably among different cultures.  Our studies focus on 
United States-based participants, however future research should look at different online 
norms of civility and their effects on behavior.  Vignovic and Thompson’s (2010) show 
that people have negative perceptions of uncivil people even if they know the uncivil 
person is from a different culture, suggesting that the effects of incivility cross cultural 
                                                             
 
39 This result was demonstrated in studies 2 and 3b with a p < .001 significance level, and 
in study 5 with a p < 0.05 significance level.  In study 4, CAPS did not significantly 
affect competence ratings. 
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borders.  The cross-cultural implications of online incivility are particularly relevant to 
the modern workplace, and guidelines for international online civility may improve 
global communication, trust, and cooperation. 
We look solely at incivility as it relates to trust and cooperation. However many 
other ethical or unethical actions can also affect these outcomes.  We believe that in 
addition to incivility, many unethical actions in online communication discourage 
cooperation and trusting relationships, and hope that future research continues to uncover 
this association. 
Kollock (1996) wrote:  “Social interaction and organization in online 
communities is not an issue that can be ignored, nor is the challenge simply to design a 
better user interface. But it is also incorrect to say that there is nothing much one can do – 
there are important steps that can be taken to encourage the development of successful 
online worlds.” One way to develop a more cooperative and trusting online world is 
through encouraging what morality demands - online civility. 
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Tables And Figures 
 
Table F1. Effect of incivility and anger on production following the message 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Received uncivil 
messages 
4.60 
(0.77)*** 
4.50 
(0.80)*** 
Received angry 
messages 
 1.12 
(1.66) 
Round number 0.31 
(0.07)*** 
0.31 
(0.07)*** 
First round price -0.37 
(0.05)*** 
-0.37 
(0.05)*** 
Constant 54.27 
(1.33) 
54.27 
(1.33) 
N 4979 4979 
Adjusted N 509 509 
R-squared 0.08 0.08 
 
Table F2. Effect of receiving uncivil messages on total game profitability 
 Total 
Profit 
Received uncivil 
messages 
-804.39 
(248.20)** 
Number of rounds 856.41 
(63.81)*** 
First round price 147.04 
(15.98)*** 
Constant -1773.43 
(890.28) 
N 1527 
Adjusted N 509 
R-squared 0.49 
 
* p<0.05 
** p<0.01 
*** p<0.001 
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Table F3. Effect of sending uncivil messages on total game profitability 
 Total Profit 
Sent uncivil 
messages 
-1095.18 
(228.58)*** 
Number of 
rounds 
856.75 
(63.93)*** 
First round 
price 
147.92 
(15.75)*** 
Constant -1842.25 
(883.71) 
N 1527 
Adjusted N 509 
R-squared 0.50 
 
Table G1. OLS of survey responses following uncivil and civil messages 
 Workplace 
Incivility 
Rapport Warmth Competence Trust 
Incivility 1: 
Cursing 
18.30 
(2.18)*** 
-17.39 
(2.13)*** 
-15.04 
(1.79)*** 
-4.44 
(1.08)*** 
-15.31 
(2.35)*** 
Incivility 2: 
Pathetic 
26.53 
(2.18)*** 
-18.03 
(2.31)*** 
-16.51 
(1.95)*** 
-6.52 
(1.17)*** 
-12.70 
(2.55)*** 
No response 8.82 
(2.22)*** 
-15.70 
(2.17)*** 
-13.91 
(1.83)*** 
-4.77 
(1.10)*** 
-7.17 
(2.40)*** 
Male -0.14 
(1.57) 
-1.99 
(1.54) 
-2.68 
(1.30) 
0.28  
(0.78) 
-0.28 
(1.70) 
Age 0.10  
(0.07) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
0.03  
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
Constant 5.88  
(3.40) 
39.80 
(3.32) 
34.16 
(2.80) 
16.32  
(1.68) 
40.70 
(3.66) 
N 113 113 113 113 113 
R-squared 0.58 0.46 0.48 0.25 0.31 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.56 0.43 0.46 0.22 0.28 
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Table G2. Mean offers in trust game following uncivil and civil messages 
 Mean 
Offer 
Mean 
expectation 
N 
Range $0 - $3   
Incivility 1: 
Cursing 
1.28 
(1.05) 
25.7% 
(26.93%) 
27 
Incivility 2: 
Pathetic 
0.95 
(0.86) 
30.89% 
(26.82%) 
13 
No response 1.52 
(0.94) 
28.65% 
(19.52%) 
21 
Neutral 1.46 
(0.72) 
39.47% 
(15.26%) 
17 
 
 
Figure 3. Study 2 mediation analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effect of the incivility prompts on trust survey responses is mediated by warmth. 
 
 
  
Incivility Trust -10.17*** 
(1.70) 
Incivility Trust 
-4.83** 
(1.46) 
Warmth 
-7.72*** 
(1.56) 
.69*** 
     (.08) 
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Table H1. OLS of survey responses following story prompts 
 Workplace 
Incivility 
Anger Trust-
worthiness
2
 
Trust Positive 
Affect 
Negative 
Affect 
Cursing 3.31 
(0.12)*** 
1..69 
(0.07)*** 
-2.71 
(0.19)*** 
-18.67 
(1.34)*** 
-24.60 
(1.29)*** 
16.91 
(1.33)*** 
Racist 3.09 
(0.11)*** 
1.25 
(0.06)*** 
-3.03 
(0.18)*** 
-18.31 
(1.31)*** 
-25.72 
(1.27)*** 
17.04 
(1.30)*** 
CAPS 2.36 
(0.11)*** 
1.17 
(0.06)*** 
-1.56 
(0.18)*** 
-11.54 
(1.31)*** 
-18.21 
(1.27)*** 
12.40 
(1.30)*** 
Suggestiv
e 
2.96 
(0.12)*** 
0.01 
(0.07) 
-3.40 
(0.19)*** 
-18.61 
(1.36)*** 
-21.69 
(1.31)*** 
17.47 
(1.35)*** 
Male 0.22  
(0.07)** 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.19 
(0.12) 
-1.75 
(0.87)* 
-1.48 
(0.84) 
1.08 
(0.86) 
Age -0.01  
(0.00)** 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01  
(0.01)* 
-0.03 
(0.38) 
-0.09  
(0.37)* 
-0.16  
(0.04)*** 
Constant 1.54  (0.16) 1.08 
(0.09) 
5.20    
(0.26) 
44.36 
(1.86) 
42.59 
(1.79) 
17.25 
(1.84) 
N 421 421 421 421 421 421 
R-
squared 
0.73 0.73 0.52 0.42 0.57 0.39 
Adjusted 
R-
squared 
0.73 0.73 0.51 0.41 0.56 0.39 
2. Trustworthiness is included in the positive affect questionnaire but was analyzed separately. 
Table I1. OLS of CAPS effect on individual positive affect items 
(Only hypothesized positive affect items were tested individually) 
 Positive 
Affect 
Overall 
Trust-
worthy 
Sincerity 
CAPS 3.25 
(1.64)* 
0.51 
(0.24)* 
0.62 
(0.25)* 
Age -0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
Male -0.67 
(0.15) 
-0.13 
(0.17) 
-0.10 
(0.17) 
Constant 44.32 
(1.98) 
5.31  
(0.29) 
5.45  
(0.30) 
N 204 204 204 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.01 0.01 0.02 
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Table J1. Mean offers in trust game following online chats 
 Mean Offer Mean 
expectation (% 
of tripled 
amount sent) 
N 
Range $0 - $3   
Overall 1.65 
(1.00) 
28.30% 
(25.61%) 
132 
Cursing 1.55   
(1.04) 
23.54% 
(24.92%) 
57 
CAPS 1.72   
(0.95) 
30.70% 
(24.53%) 
33 
Neutral 1.75   
(0.98) 
32.87% 
(26.84%) 
42 
 
Table J2. OLS of survey responses following online chats 
 Workplace 
Incivility 
Trust Positive 
Affect 
Rapport 
Cursing 3.41    
(1.34)* 
-3.15         
(1.71)* 
-5.43 
(1.92)** 
-2.36  
(1.67) 
CAPS 2.32      
(1.59) 
-0.29         
(2.04) 
-0.84        
(2.29) 
-0.92  
(1.98) 
Male 0.95      
(1.14) 
0.29          
(1.46) 
-0.38        
(1.63) 
1.48  
(1.42) 
Age 0.02      
(0.05) 
0.09          
(0.07) 
0.04        
(0.08) 
-0.03  
(0.07) 
Agreed with 
partner 
-5.22 
(1.27)*** 
4.38 
(1.62)** 
7.37 
(1.82)*** 
9.02 
(1.58)*** 
Felt strongly 0.75 
(1.22) 
1.22 
(1.56) 
0.39 
(1.75) 
1.30 
(1.52) 
Article (gun 
control) 
0.17      
(1.47) 
0.17          
(1.88) 
0.06      
(2.11) 
0.85  
(1.83) 
Constant 10.61    
(2.49) 
34.12        
(3.19) 
37.35     
(3.58) 
21.35     
(3.11) 
N 132 132 132 132 
R-squared 0.21 0.12 0.21 0.26 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.17 0.08 0.17 0.22 
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Figure 4. Study 5 Mediation analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Responses to the trust questionnaire mediate the effect of the uncivil cursing discussion 
on the amount of money sent in the trust game. 
  
$ Sent Cursing -.18 
(.16) 
Trust 
-.04 
(.16) 
$ Sent Cursing 
-3.38* 
(1.31) 
.04*** 
     (.07) 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Trust Questions 
Adapted from Johnson-George and Swap, 1982 and Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005 
Rate on a scale from 1 (not likely) to 7 (very likely) 
*If my teammate gave me a compliment I would question if s/he really meant what was 
said. 
*I wouldn't want to buy a piece of used furniture from my teammate because I wouldn't 
believe his/her estimate of its worth. 
I would be able to confide in my teammate and know that s/he would want to listen. 
I could expect my teammate to tell me the truth. 
*If my teammate unexpectedly laughed at something I did or said, I would wonder if s/he 
was being critical and unkind. 
My teammate would not intentionally misrepresent my point of view to others. 
*If my teammate knew what kinds of things hurt my feelings, I would worry that s/he 
would use them against me. 
If my teammate didn't think I had handled a certain situation very well, s/he would not 
criticize me in front of other people. 
If I told my teammate what things I worry about, s/he would not think my concerns were 
silly. 
 (* items reverse coded) 
 Negotiating with the 
millennial generation 
Why the f*** don’t they 
trust? 
 Study 1 Study 3 Study 4 Study 
2 
Study 
3b 
Study 
5 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Trust .75 .86 .78 .83 .82 .78 
185 
Appendix B: Rapport Questions 
Adapted from Jap, Robertson and Hamilton (2011) 
 
Rate on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
 
I would play another game with this teammate 
I like this teammate 
I felt like my teammate and I were on the same wavelength 
I felt rapport with my teammate 
I felt coordinated with my teammate 
I felt aware of and interested in my teammate  
 
 
 Negotiating with the 
millennial generation 
Why the f*** 
don’t they trust? 
 Study 1 Study 3 Study 4 Study 
2 
Study 
5 
Cronbach’s Alpha for 
Rapport 
.93 .94 .94 .95 .93 
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Appendix C: Affect Questions 
Adapted from Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu 2002 and Dunn, Ruedy, and Schweitzer 2012 
 
Positive Affect: 
 
I feel that [this parent] [my teammate] 
is... (on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree)) 
 
Competent 
Confident 
Intelligent 
Friendly 
Well-intentioned 
Trustworthy 
Good-Natured 
Sincere 
 
Negative Affect: 
Reading what this parent wrote makes 
me feel…  
 
 
Uncertain 
Contemptuous 
Inferior 
Disgust 
Stress 
Closeness* 
Repulsed 
Apprehensive 
(* item reverse coded) 
 
 Negotiating with the 
millennial generation 
Why the f*** don’t they 
trust? 
 Study 1 Study 4 Study 
2 
Study 
3b 
Study 
5 
Cronbach’s Alpha for 
Positive Affect 
.94 .95 .95 .95 .95 
Cronbach’s Alpha for 
Negative Affect 
   .85  
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Appendix D: Incivility Questions 
Adapted from Cortina, Magley, Williams & Langhout, 2001 
 
Rate on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
 
Did your teammate put you down? 
Was your teammate condescending to you? 
Did your teammate make demeaning or derogatory remarks? 
Did your teammate address you in unprofessional terms? 
Did your teammate ignore or exclude you? 
Did your teammate doubt your judgment? 
*Was your teammate civil with you? 
 
 (* item reverse coded) 
 
 Why the f*** don’t they trust? 
 Study 2 Study 3b Study 5 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Incivility .90 .88 .85 
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Appendix E: “OPEQ” Simulation Case Information as presented to participants. 
You are part of a small group of decision makers in a large oil producing nation. Your 
group will make a series of oil production decisions, with the goal of maximizing profit 
for your country. 
There are three oil producing countries in your world: Alba, Batia, and Capita. Each of 
these countries can produce a maximum of 75 million barrels of oil each period. 
In general, you would like to produce (and sell) more oil, but the price of oil declines as 
total supply grows. If we represent the production decisions (in millions) for Alba, Batia, 
and Capita as the sum of (QA + QB + QC), the price, P, is determined as follows:  Price 
= P = 70 - .3(QA + QB + QC) 
 
Each country has a production cost of $1.00 per barrel, and faces the same profit 
equation:   
 Profit = Qi(P – 1)  Where i = Alba, Batia, or Capita 
Each round represents one period and each period you will make a production decision 
(e.g. 50.3 million barrels). The amount of oil you and the other countries produce will be 
traded on the World Oil Exchange (and the total amount of oil produced will influence 
your profits). 
The three countries (Alba, Batia, and Capita) have no diplomatic relations, and you will 
not find out how much each other produces until after every country has made their 
production decision for the coming period. That is, each country will have to set their 
production level for the upcoming period without knowing how much other countries will 
produce. 
Your goal is to maximize profits for your country (summed over each period). 
You are not sure how many periods of decisions you will make, but before you make 
your final decision (for the last period) everyone in your world will receive an 
announcement that the upcoming period will be the final round. 
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Appendix F: “OPEQ” Simulation sample summary 
 
 
Students see this page as they make their decision of how much oil to produce in each 
round. The page indicates past performance of all countries in the world. At the bottom 
right students receive text messages from other countries in the digital messaging 
communication simulation. 
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Appendix G: Why the f*** don’t they trust: study 3 chats 
*Names were alternated and participants were randomly assigned to either male tutor 
and male parent, male tutor and female parent, female tutor and male parent, or female 
tutor and female parent. 
Please read this online chat from one of our tutors: 
 
 Cursing chat 
Simon [Regina]*: Hello, I'm a part time tutor for high school students. Do you have a son or daughter in 
high school? 
  
Tom [Joyce]*: yes. what do you want? 
  
Simon: Are they struggling with a certain subject in school? I know that when my parents first came to this 
country, tutors played an important role in their academic success. For this reason, I have decided to be a 
part time tutor for high school students. 
  
Tom: are you assuming my kids are f*cking stupid? 
  
Simon: No, I know that students often have questions about class material that they may not want to ask 
their teachers. As a tutor, I can help boost your child's grades. 
  
Tom: my kids don't need any f*cking tutoring. my kids go to a good school and have damn good teachers. 
  
Simon: I am sure your children go to an excellent school, but if they ever need help, I'm available in the 
evenings and would love to help your child in any subject. 
  
Tom: yea, well you can just leave me the hell alone. my kid doesn't need any f*cking help. 
 
Racist Chat 
Simon: Hello, I'm a part time tutor for high school students. Do you have a son or daughter in high school? 
  
Tom: yea, I have two sons. 
  
Simon: Are they struggling with a certain subject in school? I know that when my parents first came to this 
country, tutors played an important role in their academic success. For this reason, I have decided to be a 
part time tutor for high school students. 
  
Tom: well, you can go back to wherever you came from and tutor the kids there. we don't need you here. 
  
Simon: I am sure your children are very bright, but if they ever need help, I'm available in the evenings and 
would love to help your children in any subject. 
  
Tom: listen, we don't need you people here. how much can a person who's not even from here help my 
children? 
  
Simon: I am more than capable of tutoring students. 
  
Tom: just go back to your country and leave me alone. 
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Capital Letters Chat 
Simon: Hello, I'm a part time tutor for high school students. Do you have a son or daughter in high school? 
  
Tom: I'M NOT INTERESTED 
  
Simon: I don't mean to bother you, but I know that many high school students struggle with class material 
and may need extra help.  When my parents first came to this country, tutors played an important role in 
their academic success. For this reason, I have decided to be a part time tutor for high school students. 
  
Tom: if I needed help I would have LOOKED YOU UP IN THE YELLOW PAGES 
  
Simon: I hope you understand that I'm not trying to spam you. I just wanted to see if my services could be of 
help to you and your children. 
  
Tom: NO, I DON'T NEED YOUR HELP. 
  
Simon: Okay, have a good day. 
  
Tom: …BYE. 
 
Sexually Suggestive Chat 
Simon: Hello, I'm a part time tutor for high school students. Do you have a son or daughter in high school? 
  
Joyce: I do have a son but let's talk about something else. are you single?  
  
Simon: I'm  not sure if that is relevant. If you have a child who is struggling with certain subjects in high 
school, I can be of great help.   I know that when my parents first came to this country, tutors played an 
important role in their academic success. For this reason, I have decided to be a part time tutor for high 
school students 
  
Joyce: how about I take you out on a date and we can have some fun? 
  
Simon: No thank you. 
  
Joyce: I work out every day and Im really hot, you can come to my house and we'll take it from there... 
  
Simon: No... goodbye. 
 
Neutral Chat 
Simon: Hello, I'm a part time tutor for high school students. Do you have a son or daughter in high school? 
  
Tom: I have two children in high school. one daughter and one son. 
  
Simon: Are they struggling with a certain subject in school? I know that when my parents first came to this 
country, tutors played an important role in their academic success. For this reason, I have decided to be a 
part time tutor for high school students. 
  
Tom: oh, I'm sorry but I don't think my children need tutoring right now. 
  
Simon: I know that students often have questions about class material that they may not want to ask their 
teachers. As a tutor, I can help boost your child's grades. 
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Tom: I’m sure you’re a great tutor, but my kids don’t need tutoring – I will keep you in mind if they do in the 
future. 
  
Simon: Thanks for your consideration 
   
Tom: you're welcome. have a good day. 
     
Simon: Thank you. Good day to you as well. 
